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The Kindynamic Theory of Tort
CHRISTOPHER P. GUZELIAN*
Commentators complain of two major deficiencies in modern tort law: (1) that
liabilityconcepts such as "negligence" or "duty "are so vacuously defined as to permit
inadvertentsubjectivity and errorto hinderpropercase adjudication,and(2) that tort is
too slow in recognizing newly discovered risks and properly compensating nascent
classes of injury. We accordingly report on the Kindynamic Theory, an emerging
philosophy that overcomes these twin deficienciesand sharpensunderstandingofpoorly
articulatedtort intuitions.
Kindynamics contends that causationis the cornerstoneof tort,andthat all risks are,
at core, causalpropositions.Contraryto its many everyday definitions, the word "risk"
has a single exact meaning in Kindynamic Theory. A risk, unlike uncertainties, must be
objectively known to be causally possible ("epistemically possible'). Put differently,
Kindynamicsprescribes that a change in a specific allegedstimulus must be objectively
known to determine an asymmetric, directionalchange in a particularallegedharm.
Second, and in the only notable break with traditionaltort intuition,some Kindynamic
proponents advocate permitting compensation only for injuries arising from
"significant" risks: those that are (1)widespread and (2) also likely to be injurious.
Similar to common regulatorypractice, the prescriptive "significantrisk" constraint
seeks to sensibly prioritizerisk deterrence,given limitedjudicialresources.
Third, Kindynamic Theory invokes decision analysis-the method for formal,
quantitativeriskanalysis universallyfamiliarto risk analysts-toelucidaterisk tradeoffs
and make decisions about a risk's costs and benefits. With its empirical grounding,
decision analysis improves upon other cost-benefit models, which are typically too
theoreticalor assumption-ladenfor practicaluse.
Finally, courts have long desired and intuitively but unsuccessfully sought an
objective method for apportioningliabilityfor a single injury among multiple alleged
tortfeasors.Kindynamic Theory formallypresents such a method.
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INTRODUCTION
Those who have the happy fortune of attending law school recite forevermore that
duty, negligence, actual cause, proximate cause, and injury lead to tort liability.
Very well. Define "duty."
There is one condition on this challenge: a definition must permit consistent
prediction of case outcomes. Consider the traditional definition: duty is the
"foreseeabilitythat harm may result if [the duty] is not exercised."' This definitional
test of duty is surely not predictive; as far back as Palsgraf there have been doubts
about the efficacy of a "foreseeability" test in predicting duties. 2 "Foreseeability" has
proven to be a vacuous delimiter, which courts apply equally-but without consistency
3
-in the distinguishable contexts of duty, negligence, and proximate cause.

1. Orlo v. Conn. Co., 21 A.2d 402, 404 (Conn. 1941) ("The ultimate test of the
existence of a duty to use care is found in the foreseeability that harm may result if it is not
exercised.") (citing Botticelli v. Winters, 7 A.2d 443,445 (Conn. 1939)) (emphasis added).
2. Compare Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, J.)
("If no hazard was apparent to the eye of ordinary vigilance, an act innocent and harmless, at
least to outward seeming, with reference to her, did not take to itself the quality ofa tort because
it happened to be a wrong, though apparently not one involving the risk of bodily insecurity,
with reference to some one else."), with id.at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting) ("Every one owes to
the world at large the duty of refraining from those acts that may unreasonably threaten the
safety of others ....[W]hen injuries do result from our unlawful act we are liable for the
consequences. It does not matter that they are unusual, unexpected, unforeseen, and
unforeseeable.").
3. H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORt, CAUSATION INTHE LAW 273 (2nd ed. 1985)
("Liability in negligence has and must have its limits but it is not clear that foreseeability is an
appropriate notion for settling them."); Lawrence M. Solan & John M. Darley, Causation,
Contribution,and Legal Liability:An EmpiricalStudy, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 265,27475 (2001) (noting that "[iun many []cases, foreseeability plays a prominent role ....
[However,] courts are not in accord as to whether the issue to which it relates is duty, proximate
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In fact, "duty" has been so conceptually elusive that the California Supreme Court
once said, "'duty' is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of
those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is
entitled to protection. ' 4 When a notable court concedes in frustration that it cannot
predict duties, it is unsettling. Each day, law enforces sizeable-sometimes
bankrupting-judgments against "duty-violating" defendants. They are the unhappy
violators of a murky word. 3
Try defining "negligence" instead. Yes, negligence means the "breach of a duty," or
the "breach of a foreseeable obligation," but the first taxonomy is circular and the
latter, again, ineffective. They do not tell us how to predictnegligence.
Here is a final opportunity to justify law school tuition: what is "proximate cause"?
Even the most respectable courts are so confused by tort concepts that they sometimes
equate duty and proximate cause, although this substitution is incorrect.6 Is proximate7
cause a limitation on liability only to those events that are "reasonably foreseeable"?
(Observe that this standard is just a variation on the "foreseeability" test that has
proven incapable of predictably delimiting case outcomes.) Or is proximate cause a
confessedly "political" and "arbitrary" restriction?8
Unsettling looseness plagues basic definitions at the core of tort liability. An
occasional justification for this confusion is that tort law must accommodate multiple
(sometimes mutually exclusive) aims. These thinkers believe no single theory can
causation, or a generalized notion of negligence. Some judges have recognized this
disagreement among courts in analyzing this problem").
4. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 916 (Cal. 1968) (quoting WiLLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS 353 (3d ed. 1964)).

5. See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules ofInference, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1,3 (2002)
(observing that "a large fraction of legal scholarship makes at least some claims about the world
based on observation or experience" rather than on proper scientifically measured bases).
6. Invoking "duty" when discussing proximate cause has dramatic procedural
repercussions too, for proximate cause is ostensibly ajury question, while duty remains ajudge
question. Dobbs describes the general confusion between proximate cause and duty well:
Many writers and some courts favor approaching scope of risk issues involved in
proximate or legal cause decisions through the language of duty. The great
advantage of doing so is that the confusions engendered by the use of causal
language might be avoided .... [Flew if any judges can specialize in the diverse
legal issues that confront them. They cannot all be up-to-date experts in tort
theory. Consequently, when judges confront a problem already labeled as a
proximate cause problem, the label alone is likely to have at least some subliminal
effects that steer analysis in the wrong direction.
But... duty issues themselves are slippery chameleons. Moreover, to cast an issue
in terms of duty is to provide another subliminal suggestion-namely that the
decision is to be made by judges rather than juries.
1 DAN B. Dons, THE LAW OF TORTS § 230, at 584-85 (2001).
7. See Poskus v. Lombardo's of Randolph, Inc., 670 N.E.2d 383, 386 (Mass. 1996)
("There must be limits to the scope or definition of reasonable foreseeability based on
considerations of policy and pragmatic judgment.").
8. Palsgraf,162 N.E. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting) ("What we do mean by the word
'proximate' is that, because ofconvenience, of public policy, ofa rough sense ofjustice, the law
arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point. This is not logic. It is
practical politics.").
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represent tort's scope. One leading tort scholar, Vanderbilt Professor John Goldberg,
rejects this view:
Must we, or ought we, concede that all we can say of any given tort decision, or
any given tort doctrine, is that, if well-rendered, it will reflect the attainment ofan
unarticulated and unarticulable balance among various considerations-including
some that are diametrically opposed? ... [To make such a concession, is to give
up on the idea of law.9
Even if Professor Goldberg is right and tort does have articulable and coherent
aims, current liability standards are not achieving them. As we have seen, tort is based
on vacuous (and therefore easily manipulated) terms. To achieve better consistency and
in case outcomes, tort requires better standards for determining
predictability
0
liability.'
There is still a second dilemma that tort faces beyond these inherent linguistic
shortcomings. Commentators now also acknowledge that tort-as it is practiced in
courts and regardless of which particular theory one favors-does not sufficiently
accommodate the expanding scope of contemporary risks and the accelerating pace of
risk assessment and risk discovery. " Professor Goldberg, for instance, has commented
that:
[O]ne may speculate that, in the near term, mechanized accidents will cease to
provide the focal point of tort .... [I]t is quite possible that tort theorists soon will
be required to provide... comprehensive and comprehending theories of torttheories that see the "new negligence" as part of a multifaceted yet broadly
coherent law of wrongs.12
Tort law will have to adjust in two ways, then, to remain current and relevant to the
remuneration of injuries caused in contemporary society. First, it must create more
exact and rigorous judicial tests of liability that better articulate long-standing tort law

9. John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEo. L.J. 513, 580 (2003).
10. Cf LUDWIG WrrrGENSTEIN, CULTURE AND VALUE 18e (Peter Finch trans., University
of Chicago 1984) (1931) ("Language sets everyone the same traps; it is an immense network of
easily accessible wrong turnings. And so we watch one man after another walking down the
same paths and we know in advance where he will branch off, where he will walk straight on
without noticing the side turning, etc. etc. What I have to do then is erect signposts at all the
junctions where there are wrong turnings so as to help people past the danger points."). Some
have argued that incentives of trial attorneys and judges favors an expansionist universe of tort
with muddied, inefficient standards. See Todd J. Zwicki, Public Choiceand Tort Reform, Geo.
Mason Law & Econ Research Paper No. 00-36 (2000), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=244658.
11. Stephen D. Sugarman, A Century of Change in PersonalInjury Law, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 2403, 2436 (2000) ("[T]he role of personal injury law at the end ofthe twenty-first century
is probably as unpredictable as its current role was at the end of the nineteenth. Not only might
personal injury law doctrine and the background institutions to tort law change significantly, but
also technological advances may well change the pattern of accidental bodily injury that will
exist 100 years from now in ways we cannot anticipate.").
12. Goldberg, supra note 9, at 582-83.
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intuitions. Next, a modem theory must accommodate changes in the alleged sources of
injuries that are being litigated.
3
Here, we report on the development of the Kindynamic Theory,1 which is rapidly
gaining support among academics and is starting to surface (anonymously, as yet) in
courts as a considerable step in the direction of a unifying theory that reflects
longstanding intuitions about tort, while offering considerably more flexibility over
past theories to accommodate new alleged sources of injuries.14
I. A CAPSULE INTRODUCTION TO THE KINDYNAMIC THEORY
Many tort scholars emphasize the risk-deterrence aspect of tort,15 yet common
dictionaries contain a dozen different definitions of the word "risk." Even leading risk
philosophers assert that a "risk" cannot be precisely defined.16 Tort scholars curiously
have not commented on this striking conclusion, although it has sizeable repercussions
for the courtroom.
Proponents of Kindynamic Theory contend that standardless or "common sense"
notions of "risk" in place of a clear definition means assigning liability is inevitably an
17
arbitrary, subjective enterprise, even though courts strivefor objectivity. A precise
and
negligence,
duty,
surrounding
remove
ambiguity
would
of
risk
definition
proximate cause and permit more predictable and consistent case outcomes.
Kindynamic theorists believe risks are rigorously definable. They contend that a
judicially cognizable "risk" incorporates three distinct concepts: (1) a risk identifies an
objectively known (epistemic) causal relationship between a stimulus A and a
harmful/injurious effect B (sometimes expressed as "A-*B"); (2) a risk expresses a
quantified frequency of occurrence (avoiding extrapolation) and that risk is sufficiently
likely to result in harm, sufficiently widespread, and sufficiently costly as to merit
and (3) a risk involves an effect B that is undesirable (a "harm" or
judicial redress;
"injury").' 8 Linguistically, therefore, a statement of "risk" contains a causal, a

13. The term "Kindynamics" derives from the Greek "kindynos" ("risk").
14. Kindynamic Theory is both prescriptive and explanatory. Its risk prioritization
requirement is a logical, but never practiced, proposal for tort law. Its clarification of tort
definitions and delimiters, however, is not prescriptive, but rather an attempt to precisely
articulate intuitions that have underlain tort law throughout the past century. Similarly, decision
analysis, another element of Kindynamics, is "new" to tort law, but including it in the theory
does not make Kindynamics prescriptive in that regard. Instead, decision analysis is simply a
more refined method of conducting cost-benefit considerations long accepted as an integral part
of tort.
15. There have been so many articles discussing this major focus oftort theory that it is
not worthwhile to itemize them here.
16. See generallyJOHN C. CHICKEN & TAMAR POSNER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RISK (1998).
17. Cf.Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443,496 (1953) (Frankfurter, J.) ("Discretion without
a criterion for its exercise is authorization of arbitrariness.").
18. Because harms are subjective, there is obvious trouble in deciding whether a given
effect is objectively undesirable (i.e., whether an effect, B, is a "harm" or rather, a "benefit").
Moreover, objectively identifying the proper scope of an effect or harm B is hardly a trivial
enterprise, either. The number of unwanted effects created by a given stimulus varies with
different acts. For example, in one case defendants' failure to clean a barge's hold caused
accumulation of explosive gases. Johnson v. Kosmos Portland Cement Co., 64 F.2d 193, 194
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numerical, and a nominative connotation: There is a ten percent (numerical) risk of
lung cancer (nominative) from cigarette smoking (causal).'9
What becomes immediately apparent from this definition is that a risk must be
established not just numerically, but also causally. Experts are often asked to
determine "risks" even when there is insufficient knowledge of causation (A-*B) or
probabilities, or both. To deal with such gaps in knowledge, in some cases causality is
inferredor simply assumed, as is a probability. Still, the term "risk" is often invoked to
describe such derivations or "discoveries." In reality, what are being referred to are not
risks, but rather causal possibilities or hypotheses ("uncertainties"). Kindynamic
Theory demands, therefore, that the causal soundness of anyjudicially cognizable risk
be established before all else. This process is described in Parts II and III.
In the only purely prescriptive break with traditional tort intuition, many (but not
all) Kindynamic theorists advocate compensation only for injuries arising from risks
that are "significant," that is, that: (1) are likely to result in injury (the risk is
"injurious") and (2) affect a large number of people or a sizeable amount of property
(the risk is "widespread"). 20 Similar to practices at some regulatory agencies, 21 a

(6th Cir. 1933). Lightning struck the barge, it exploded, and two men died. Id. The court, faced
with an issue of deciding what the risk of harm was before it could find liability, chose to
classify the A--*B risk broadly as some intervening incendiary force. However, it could have
framed the question much more narrowly as "the risk of lightning strike." Deciding how broadly
to classify these liability-fixing attributes is in turn a function of the number of untoward
outcomes associated with a stimulus in a particular context. See id. at 196 n.3 ("The particular
consequences ofnegligence are almost invariably surprises. It is the unexpected rather than the
expected that happens in the great majority of the cases of negligence. It is not necessary [for
liability to attach] that injury in the precise form in which it in fact resulted should have been
foreseen.") (citations omitted); Stodola v. Grunwald Mech. Contractors, Inc., 422 N.W.2d 341,
344 (Neb. 1988) ('The law does not require precision in foreseeing the exact hazard or
consequence which happens. It is sufficient if what occurs is one of the kind of consequences
which might reasonably be foreseen."') (quoting Brown v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 306
N.W.2d 167, 171 (Neb. 1981)). Legal theorists, as they have come closer to understanding the
true causal nature of risk, have also correctly perceived that framing (1) the scope of an injury
and (2) the risk "density" is integral to defining a risk. These concepts of correctly framing the
risk density and delimiting the scope of the harm or stimulus are quite important. We have
discussed this elsewhere. See infra note 87. But see Edward S. Abrams et al., At the End of
Palsgraf, there is Chaos: An Assessment ofProximate Cause in Light of Chaos Theory, 59 U.
PITr. L. REv. 507 (1998) (contending that some injuries may be the result of external shocks to a
condition-sensitive chaotic system).
19. Occasionally common parlance will refer only to the harm as a risk, for example,
"What is the risk of dying?" Observe that this particular risk proposition does not take exactly
the same form as the four we state in the main text, see infra text accompanying note 39; it
focuses upon the harm (death), but no cause is identified. We can understand this "risk" to be an
aggregation-it asks for the likelihood of an effect summed across all causes. Although
aggregated risk propositions such as this are commonly referred to as "risks," they are of little
use for assigning individual causal blame and liability, as in legal circumstances. See infra note
45.
20. As is discussed in detail in Part III, infra, the injuriousness of a risk and the reach of
the risk are inversely related variables under Kindynamic Theory. As the reach of a risk
increases, the threshold injuriousness necessary for liability decreases, and vice versa.
21. See infra notes 77, 94.
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"significance" requirement attempts to sensibly prioritize which risks to deter using
limited judicial resources. Part IV.A discusses Kindynamic risk "significance."
Kindynamic Theory next calls for quantitative analysis of the social benefits and
costs of the act, in context, that gives rise to the litigated injury. Here, Kindynamic
Theory offers improvement at achieving the traditional goal of Learned Hand-style
cost-benefit considerations when it introduces decision analysis-astaple method of
23
22
quantitative risk analysis-to the legal arena. Part IV.B describes decision analysis.
Assimilating considerations from Parts II through IV, Part V formally presents three
fundamental Kindynamic definitions: negligence, duty, and proximate cause
("proximate risk").
Finally, as Part VI reveals, Kindynamic Theory is a tort theory that is capable of
precisely apportioning liability for a single injury among multiple potential
contributors.
In sum, the Kindynamic Theory offers great promise as a predictable, consistent
means of deterring risks caused by social actors and of remunerating injured plaintiffs.
II. CAUSALITY
Classic definitions of causality describe an external stimulus 4 capable of producing
internal change in an object (i.e., an "effect") as the "cause" of that change.25

22. Social justice theorists object to the utilitarian nature of Kindynamic Theory. Even
among those who agree that an objective standard must be used in assessing risk (and some
social justice theorists, curiously, do not even accept this proposition), they contend that where a
risk results in injury, recompense must follow. Kindynamic Theory acknowledges this argument
as theoretically plausible. However, for a judicial system where litigation costs are more
reminiscent of Soviet economies than a zero-transaction cost realm, Kindynamic Theory stresses
pragmatism over utopia: it allocates court time and resources toward redress of the most
prevalent or deleterious risks first. Kindynamics contends that if the judicial system must deny
complete justice to some (and it must because of limits on time and resources), better it would
be to deny recovery for those who suffer from infrequently caused risks, as there would be less
social deterrence resulting from such damage awards.
23. This article does not fully address the strong contributions that the law and
economics literature has made to tort theory, some of which have cast doubt on the
differentiation between negligence, intent, and strict liability. See, e.g., Ronald Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). See also STEvEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 32-36 (1987) (demonstrating that in many instances, the answer to
whether a negligence or strict liability rule is economically preferable is indeterminate).
Kindynamic Theory is certainly capable of incorporating the economists' critiques. As the
reader will see in Part IV.B when we discuss decision analysis, however, the particular form of
Kindynamic Theory that we are reporting on maintains the distinction, in part because
economists have not shown convincingly that courts would have the financial and time
resources to handle strict liability cases the same as negligence-even if it might be net
beneficial from a social standpoint.
24. A stimulus in its broadest sense could be any act, omission, action, event,
circumstance, element, occurrence, and so on. Because tort law focuses on humans' acts, when
we speak of a "stimulus" after this introductory section, we will almost categorically be referring
to anthropogenicstimuli-actions, omissions, or creations bypeople.
25. ARISTOTLE, PHYSICS, bk. I,ch. 3, 194b5, at 28-29 (W. Charlton trans., Clarendon Press
1970) (n.d.) (defining efficient cause as "the primary source of the change or the staying
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Symbolically, causality
is represented as a "causalpath,"A--B, with an arrow between
26
stimulus and effect:
Figure 1
A-+B: A Causal Path

The path arrow symbolizes causality, but it does not suggest a method for proving
that a particular stimulus A "causes" a particular effect B. Galileo sought to rectify this
gap. He postulated that an "efficient cause" exists where a stimulus A is both necessary
and sufficient for the outcome B.27
Causality to later thinkers like Pierre Laplace and John Stuart Mill was instead
holistic: a universal interconnectedness, involving a number of stimuli and effects
beyond human comprehension (and thus "infinite"). 28 By this, every effect is thejoint
unchanged: for example, the man who has deliberated is a cause, the father is a cause of the
child, and in general that which makes something of that which is made, and that which changes
something of that which is changed"); ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS, bk. I, ch. 3,983a-b, (W.D. Ross
ed., Clarendon Press 1924) (n.d.) (defining four elements of causality, including efficient cause).
26. Causal chains involve multiple paths, sometimes with causality running
bidirectionally, where our dots represent both stimuli to subsequent effects and effects to
antecedent stimuli. See Christopher P. Guzelian, Liability & Fear,65 Omo ST. L.J. 713,728 fig.
2 (2004).
27. See GALILEO, The Assayer, in DISCOVERIES AND OPIIONS OF GALILEO 229, 231-80
(Stillman Drake trans., 1957) (1623).
28. PIERRE SIMON, MARQUIS DIELAPLACE, A PHILOSOPHicAL ESSAY ON PROBABILITIES 4

(Frederick Wilson Truscott & Frederick Lincoln Emory trans., Dover Publ'ns, Inc. 1951) (1819)
(stating Laplace's Demon: "We ought then to regard the present state of the universe as the
effect of its anterior state and as the cause ofthe one which is to follow. Given for one instant an
intelligence which could comprehend all the forces by which nature is animated and the
respective situation of the beings who compose it-an intelligence sufficiently vast to submit
these data to analysis-it would embrace in the same formula the movements of the greatest
bodies of the universe and those of the lightest atom; for it, nothing would be uncertain and the
future, as the past, would be present to its eyes."); JOHN STUART MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC 214
(Longmans, Green & Co. 1941) (1843) (stating that, in order to understand the cause of an
event, one has to understand the totality of changing conditions, both positive and negative,
which in their cooperation invariably and unconditionally result in the mentioned event).
Another significant protest, put forth in various statements by Descartes, Locke, Berkeley,
Hume, and Kant, was that causality might be nothing more than a relation-anentirely fictional
mental construct. See GEORGE BERKELEY, WORKS passim (Alexander Campbell Fraser ed.,
Clarendon Press 1871) (1709-52); RENE DESCARTES, MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY
passim (John Cottingham trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1986) (1641); DAVID HUME, AN
ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING § vii (The Open Court Publ'g Co. 1949)
(1748); DAVID HUME, ATREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE bk. I, pt. 111, §§ ii-iv(L.A. Selby-Bigge
ed., Clarendon Press 1888) (1739); IMMANUEL KANT, KRITIK DER REINEN VERNUNFT (1787); 1

20051

THE KIND YNAMIC THEORY OF TORT

product of all stimuli that exist or have existed in the universe at any time prior to that
effect. By taking away any one stimulus, it would be impossible to know how that
deletion would impact on the effect unless one knew the causal interconnectivity of all
remaining stimuli in that universe. 29 Because human knowledge is limited, Galileo's
efficient causality is unattainable.
This holistic critique found advocates in the logical positivist movement
(spearheaded by Bertrand Russell) 30 , and confirmation in scientific fields like quantum
mechanics 3' and chaos theory. 32 Holists rejected as fictitious any causal path between
finite sets of stimuli and effects, such as in Figure 1, "as a thread external and parallel
to the remaining threads. 33
Although this attack was so persuasive that even Galilean diehards began to
34
concede that "strict causal lines or chains simply do not exist," philosopher Mario
Bunge explains that the isolation of artificial causal paths betweenfinite numbers of
stimuli "approximately" necessary and/or sufficient for a finite number of effects
remains man's best rough-and-ready method for the acquisition of knowledge:
The isolation of a system from its surroundings, of a thing or process from its
[infinite] context, of a quality from the complex of interdependent qualities to
which it belongs-such "abstractions," in short, are indispensable not only for the
applicability ofcausal ideas but for any research, whether empirical or theoretical.
... [I]t
is the concern of science to analyze such mazes of interconnected
elements, singling out a few entities and features, and focusing on them with the
hope of attaining a better understanding of the whole after the singled-out parts
have finally been replaced in it. Holists complain that this procedure damages the
totality concerned, and this is true; but analysis is the sole known method of
attaining a rational understanding of the whole: first it is decomposed into
bk. II, ch. xxvi, § 1 (Alexander
Campbell Fraser ed., Dover Publ'ns, Inc. 1959) (1690). One cannot dismiss this possibility. Yet
we do not address the issue further. If we are simply "brains in a vat," significantly greater
existential crises than whether a particular plaintiff should recover from a defendant for injury
will arise! But cf.MICHAEL HEUMER, SKEPTICISM AND THE VEIL OF PERCEPTION (Rowan &
Littlefield 2001) (providing a readable overview of skepticism and a direct realist's rebuttal to
it); John Foster, Induction, Explanation and Natural Necessity, 83 Proceedings Aristotelian
Society 87 (1983) (inference to the best explanation is capable of withstanding skeptics'
JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

arguments).
29. John Bernal explained this concept succinctly: "[C]hance variations or side
reactions are always taking place. These never completely cancel each other out, and there
results an accumulation which sooner or later provides a trend in a different direction from that
of the original system." J. D. BERNAL, THE FREEDOM OF NECESSITY 31 (1949).
30. Bertrand Russell, On the Notion of Cause, in MYSTICISM AND LOGIC 188 (1957).
31. See, e.g., H. PorNcARit, THERMODYNAMIQUE ix (J.Blondin ed., 1908) ("On the

deterministic hypothesis the state of the universe is determined by an excessively large number,
n, ofparameters which I shall call xl, x2,..., xn.If the value of these n parameters are known
at any given instant, and their time derivatives are also known, then the values of the same
parameters at a previous or at a later time can be calculated.") (translation by author).
32. See generally JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE (1987); ILYA
PRIGOGINE, THE END OF CERTAINTY: TIME, CHAOS, AND THE NEW LAWS OF NATURE (1997);
STEPHEN WOLFRAM, A NEW KIND OF SCIENCE (2002).
33. MARIO BUNGE, CAUSALITY AND MODERN SCIENCE

34. Id. at 133.

132 (3d ed. 1979).
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artificially isolated elements, then an attempt is made to synthesize the
components. The best grasp of reality is not obtained by35 respecting fact and
avoiding fiction but by vexing fact and controlling fiction.
Bunge further suggests such finite causal paths or chains "afford both a satisfactory
are
approximate picture [of universal interconnectedness]," but only if the chains
36
drawn "in particular respects, in limited domains, and for short time intervals.
Although causality is an approximation of reality, establishing causality is
emphatically not a subjective art. Rather, as Bunge states, it is a process of "vexing fact
and controlling fiction. 37 Properly established risks embody an objectively good
causal depiction.38 As the next sections shall demonstrate, what is therefore required is
a method by which to bifurcate risks (objectively known "epistemic" causal
relationships) and "uncertainties"(hypothetical causes of harm).

III. RJSK VS. UNCERTAINTY
All proposed relationships between a given stimulus and a given effect are either
possible or impossible. Impossible are those that contradict logic or violate a known
scientific law. It is impossible (with apologies to string theorists) for a person to be in
two places at once, for a person to walk through a wall (two material objects cannot
occupy the same space at the same time), or (with apologies to Michael Crichton) for a
that risks
person to be devoured by a dinosaur (extinct animals cannot bite). It follows
39
must not be impossible. Consider, then, the following four propositions:
(1) What is your risk of being trampled by a non-equine horse?
(2) What is your risk of being trampled by a horse galloping faster than the speed
of light?
(3) What is your risk of being trampled by a four-legged alien?
(4) What is your risk of being trampled by a horse?
Kindynamics, in establishing whether a proposition is indeed a "risk,"firstexamines
whether the proposed method of causing harm ispossibleand known, and then answers

35. Id. at 129.
36. Id. at 133. Indeed, even when approximations of reality are known to be less
accurate than the "best" present human knowledge, such approximations may still be valid in
certain contexts. Consider that Einstein's theory of relativity displaced Newtonian force as the
"proper" approximation of velocities approaching light speed, yet Newtonian force equations
are still taught in introductory physics classes and were employed in sending men to the moon.
So too is finite causality a sufficient everyday means to categorizing relationships. We do not
need quantum mechanics to build a bridge. Chaotic or quantum events that radically defy causal
models do not typically impinge meaningfully on our daily lives or even on most scientific
investigation. This fact permits finite causality to persist so hardily.
37. Id. at 129 (emphasis added).
38. Without such objectivity, "remedies" based on bogus "risks" punish "wrongdoers"
who are accused (subjectively and sometimes absent any appropriate evidence) of "creating"
harms. Liability, in effect, becomes limitless without objective causation.
39. Harvard physicist Dick Wilson helped motivate these scenarios. See Richard
Wilson, Ensuring Sound Science in the Courts, 26 TECH. INSoc'Y 501 (2004).
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what the probabilityof each proposition's occurrence is, as we do now for the four
propositions:
Scenario 1: Horses, by definition, are equine. A non-equine horse is what Plato
called a logicalimpossibility;40 it is impossible because it requires an object to embody
a principle and its logical opposite. Because such a creature is impossible, we are
inclined to say that the probability of being trampled by one is zero.
Scenario 2: Impossibly violates Einstein's laws of relativity. The justification for
impossibility, however, is not the same as in the first scenario. A warp speed horse is
not illogical. But it defies a natural law, and one concludes that Scenario 2 is
impossible. (By extension, the probability of being trampled is zero.)
Scenario 3: Self-professed alien abductees aside, currently there is not convincing
evidence of alien life. But insomuch as the notion contravenes no law of nature, it is
fornallypossiblethat a four-legged alien could exist and could trample someone. (We
should resist the urge to quickly add that this harm is "quite unlikely" to occur, to avoid
commingling the causal and numerical aspects of risk. This is a point we shall return to
momentarily.)
Scenario 4: It is possible to be trampled by a horse-there are numerous historical
and ongoing examples of such accidents. Estimating the probability of particular
persons being trampled would then require understanding such circumstances as place
and time.
The four scenarios suggest that merely stating the possibility of a relationship,
A---B, as a quantified probability does not suffice to establish that A- *B is a risk. There
are three classes of possibility: (1) logical, (2) nomological,and (3) epistemic. A risk
must be logical; a "non-equine horse" cannot be included in a causal chain. A risk must
also be nomological(i.e., comply with laws of nature); the alleged owner of a warpspeed horse cannot be held legally liable.4 1 These are easy requirements. But for alien
tramplings and ordinary horse tramplings, observe that one cannot rule out the
"possibility" of each causal relationship-each is a nomological possibility.
Nomological possibilities are causal uncertainties,conjectures, hypotheses. They await
confirmation, might in some cases have been partly corroborated through scientific
investigation, but are either not yet scientifically known "facts," or, if they at one time
had achieved such "factual" status, have reverted to mere uncertainties because of
evidence. Thus, an alien trampling is nomologically possible, even
newer contradictory
42
if it is unknown.

40. See, PLATO, MENO passim (G.M.A. Grube trans., 1976) (invoking Socratic
"elenchus" to prove logical impossibilities).
41. How scientific laws are established is, like any issue of knowledge, a topic for
epistemologists. We leave this debate to them, insomuch as it is not hugely important for our
purposes of distinguishing nomological from epistemic possibility. The interested reader can see
D.M. ARMSTRONG, WHAT IS A LAW OF NATURE? (1983); JOHN W. CARROLL, LAWS OF NATURE
(1994); IGOR HANZEL, THE CONCEPT OF SCIENTIFIC LAW IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND
EPISTEMOLOGY: A STUDY OF THEORETICAL REASON (1999); Carl G. Hempel, Studies in the Logic
of Explanation, in ASPECTS OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION (1965) (essay originally coauthored

with Dr. Paul Oppenheim); and Carl G. Hempel, Postscript(1964) to Studies in the Logic of
Explanation, in ASPECTS OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION (1965).

42. Compare EUGENE F. MALLOVE & GREGORY L. MATLOFF, THE STARFLIGHT
(1989) (restricting discussion of space travel to present and reasonably anticipated
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Epistemic possibilities, in contrast, are those nomological possibilities that are
objectively known-causal relations that are objective "facts" on the basis of the best
scientific evidence at a given moment in time.43 A trampling by an ordinary horse is
known-it has happened before, continues to happen in modem times, and is
expectable as long as man and horse interact.
A risk is based only on epistemic possibility. In this past century, there has been
insufficient discussion by philosophers or legal theorists of this need. 44 But a few latenineteenth and early-twentieth century European thinkers, beginning with German
physiologist and epistemologist Johannes von Kries, recognized it. 45 In an important
1886 publication,4 von Kries criticized the use of quantified probabilities for which
the underlying "possibility" is not objectively known. 7 To resolve possibility in any

technologies), with JOHN H. MAULDIN, PROSPECTS FOR INTERSTELLAR TRAVEL (1992) (discussing

nomological possibilities of space travel, including space warps, Zero Point Energy, and Higgs
fields).
43. Philosophers might find our term "epistemic possibility" ambiguous, because
"epistemic" simply means "known" possibility. An epistemic possibility could be "subjectively"
known or "objectively" known. By "epistemic" we are referring only to "objectively known"
possibilities. We prefer "epistemic" because the word "objective" has too much linguistic
baggage attached already.
44. ContraStordahl v. Rush Implement Co., 417 P.2d 95, 99 (Mont. 1966) ("Whenever
a medical expert testifies that an asserted cause of disease is possible, this alone is not to be
accepted as reasonable medical proof.") (emphasis in original).
45. Prior to von Kries, the reigning causality theorist was Maximilian von Buff, whose
conception of causality-as-applied-in-law was Laplacian:
[T]he German criminal jurist, von Buri, [I developed the theory of conditio sine
qua non in the sense of a so-called doctrine of equivalence. Since all cooperating
conditions within the [Laplacian] causal relation are equally necessary no one of
them could be eliminated without at the same time canceling the effect, and since
determining their greater or lesser quantitative operations transcends human
cognitive ability, he formulated the statement that all conditions are equal in value.
... [Von Buri concluded] that every conditio sine qua non may separately be
viewed as a cause [in law], when all others are given.
HERMAN DOOYEWEERD, ESSAYS INLEGAL, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL PHILOSoPHY 40 (1996). Von

Budi recognized that determining Laplacian causality is beyond human capability. To avoid this
problem, he concluded that legal causality should be inferred equally for each condition. This
doctrine of equivalence has a homespun "equality" appeal, but everything in the universe has
such Laplacian causal properties. Under the doctrine of equivalence, the judge who sentences a
murderer is also a cause ofthat murder, simply because the judge existed at the time it occurred.
Because the doctrine of equivalence admits such silly propositions, it is not useful for
establishing liability.
46. JOHANNEs VON KREs, PRINCIPIEN DER WAHRSCHEINLICHKEITSRECHNUNG (2d ed.

1927). It is said that von Kries's work on epistemic possibilities ("objective Moglichkeiten")
had sizeable influence on John Maynard Keynes's later work on uncertainty.
47. When... we say that a certain Event (Occurence) is to be expected with
a specific, quantified probability, we have made the positive claim therein

that the relevant Event is bounded by a certain 'Relationship Space,'
(Verhaltungs-Spielraum) [which is limited in scope as a result of the
imprecision of our knowledge]. Every probability expression therefore

contains (causal) knowledge of objective meaning at its core.... There are
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other fashion or, worse, to ignore it, would make probabilities appearto reflect causal
inference when in fact they might not.
What has been missing, however, is a consistent, objective protocol by which to
separate epistemic possibilities from nomological ones. The dividing "line" is
sometimes a fuzzy boundary, within which it is occasionally open to debate whether a
given stimulus-and-effect relationship is epistemically known. But the exception does
not undercut the rule. Most pitches are called either balls or strikes based on a
predefined strike zone, even if some close pitches spawn controversy. The existence of
legitimate debate over how to classify some possibilities that rest at the interface does
not disprove the logic of a dichotomous categorization.
Said differently, most proposed A--B relationships are not murky or difficult to
assess. Alien tramplings are not "known." They are only hypothetical possibilities
according to the best scientific evidence. Von Kries would say that while alien
tramplings are nomologically possible, it is illegitimate and deceitful to discuss a
quantified "risk" of an alien trampling.48 Instead, Kindynamic theorists refer to such
unknown possibilities as "uncertainties.'"49 This is because such propositions are
predicated on an insufficiently corroborated s0hypothesis (i.e., a hypothesis backed by
assumptions), rather than on what is knownf

several easily recognizable and essentially different parts to this knowledge.
First, there must be a certain knowledge of the actual relation according to
measures that define the essential Relationship Space of the probability.
This same knowledge must also, at least partially, be imprecise in the
aforementioned sense [of Relationship Space]; in another way, however, it
is essential that the knowledge be precise. (For example, the quantified
relationship between the amounts in relation to each other.)
Id. at 75 (translation by author).
48. Thus, von Kries would disapprove ofthe Drake Equation, an equation formulated in
1961 that supposedly offers a means of estimating the probability of other intelligent life in the
universe. See SETI Institute, Drake Equation, at http://www.seti.org/site/pp.asp?c=ktJ2J9M
MIsE&b= 179073 (last visited Feb. 1, 2005) (describing the Drake Equation "factors" included
in computing the probability of intelligent alien life).
49. The reader must take care not to confuse the Kindynamic definition of "uncertainty"
with lay definitions, or, for that matter, with the way some who have overlooked the causal
prerequisite to establishing a "risk" use the word: to describe those nomological possibilitiesboth known and unknown-for which a reliable probability is not easily ascertained. See, e.g.,
Richard Posner, A Few Closing Thoughts (Aug. 29, 2004), available at
http://lessig.org/blog/archives/posner.shtml (last visited May 17,2005) ("There is an old but still
useful distinction between 'risk' and 'uncertainty,' the former referring to contingencies to
which a probability can be attached, the latter to contingencies to which no probability can be
attached. The former is the domain of insurance and cost-benefit analysis. The latter? No one
can assign a probability to any given time, place, or manner of a terrorist attack within a very
broad range (obviously some possibilities can be excluded); and yet we have to take
counterrorist [sic] measures; we have, in short, to manage uncertainty as well as risk.").
50. To be sure, self-proclaimed UFO abductees will insist that their personal encounters
make alien tramplings known, not just nomological possibilities. But if courts simply accept
anecdotal, improperly selective, or subjective evidence that does not reflect the "best" scientific
evidence (or even of opinions advanced by a professed "authority" or "expert"), separation of
nomological and epistemic possibilities cannot occur.
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The distinctions between "known impossibilities" (those propositions that either
defy logic or known natural laws) and "nomological possibilities," and the further
bifurcation of nomological possibilities into "risks" and "uncertainties," can be
represented as a flow diagram:5 1
Figure 2
Establishing Whether a Proposition is a Risk
Known (Causal) ]
'Epistemic
Possibility"

I

jwomologicall
Possibility"

13

"Risk"

F Not
Impossible

Stimulus A
Harm B?

_

causes

Uncertainty"
b

~[NtKnown

In 1956, Harvard Medical School Dean Sydney Burwell succinctly identified the
fundamental epistemological problem in assessing what is objectively "known" at any
given time when he stated: "My students are dismayed when I say to them, 'Half of
what you are taught as medical students will in ten years have been shown to be wrong.
And the trouble is, none of your teachers knows which half.' 52 Burwell's quote
illustrates that causality is tied to a definite moment in time. At one moment, a relation
A---B may reflect the best scientific theory, but not earlier or later. Scientific
explanation builds causal paths and chains, and then deconstructs 3 and reconstructs

51. Table adapted from Philip S. Guzelian et al., Evidence-Based Toxicology: A
ComprehensiveFrameworkfor Causation,24 HuM. &EXPERIMENTAL TOXICOLOGY 161 (2005).
© 2005 Edward Arnold (Publishers) Ltd. All rights reserved.
52. G.W. Pickering, The Purpose of Medical Education, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 113, 115
(1956).
53. Deconstructing finite causal chains in an infinite causal nexus might seem like
"proving the negative"-demonstrating that a relation does not exist. Strictly speaking, proving
the negative is impossible for any infinite set. Nonetheless, because of something that Michael
Martin calls the Negative Evidence Principle, we can approximately and objectively "prove" the
absence,just as we can objectively "prove" the existence of a finite causal chain:
A person is justified in believing thatXdoes not exist if(l) all the available
evidence used to support the view that Xexists is shown to be inadequate;
and (2) X is the sort of entity that, ifX exists, then there is a presumption
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links as compelling contradictory or corroboratory evidence is found. This explanatory
process is not always progressive. The Dark Ages, in which anecdotal experience,
ungrounded hypotheses, unscientific alchemy, and mythos reigned, caused loss of
public knowledge. 54 Scientific "explanations" are no less immune to55fashion or to fancy
than fiction itself if they do not derive from an objective protocol.

Thus, according to Kindynamic Theory, an objective, consistent metric for
"knowing what we know" at a given time is essential.5 6 Without such, some of the most
taken-for-granted "facts" or so-called "risks"-even when advocated by well-regarded
authoritieS7--turn out to be nothing more than uncertainties. Consider, for instance,
that [there] would be evidence adequate to support the view that Xexists;
and (3) this presumption has not been defeated although serious efforts
have been made to do so; and (4) the area where evidence would appear, if
there were any, has been comprehensively examined; and (5) there are no
acceptable beneficial reasons to believe that X exists.
MICHAEL MARTIN, ATHEISM: A PHILOSOPHICAL JUSTIFICATION 283 (1990).

54. See, e.g., Michael J. Minnicino, The New Dark Age: The FrankfurtSchool and
Correctness,"
I
FIDELIO
4
(1992),
available
at
http://www.schillerinstitute.org/fid_91-96/921_frankfurt.html (contending that the "Frankfurt
School" of academia, public opinion polls, infotainment, and political correctness are causing a
deconstruction of modern culture and scientific knowledge akin to the Dark Ages' regression).
"Political

55. See, e.g., AM. COUNCIL ON Sci. AND HEALTH, FACTS VERSUS FEARS: A REvIEw OFTHE
GREATEST UNFOUNDED HEALTH SCARES OF RECENT TIMES (4th ed. 2004) (reviewing the

deleterious effects of 25 prominent fear epidemics based on uncertainties or minute risks,
including the 1959 Cranberry Scare, Red Dye Number 2, saccharin, hair dyes, Three Mile
Island, and cellular phones); CARL SAGAN, BROCA'S BRAIN: REFLECTIONS ON THE ROMANCE OF

SCIENCE 43-146 (1979) (recounting various historical anecdotes of "Paradoxers"-pseudoscientists-who propagated widespread myths).
56. It is critical that we understand that an epistemic possibility is linked to a specific
moment in time. What is uncertain today may tomorrow become epistemic because of critical
experiment or carefully controlled observation that corroborates the causal relation.
57. Philip S. Guzelian & Christopher P. Guzelian, Authority-Based Explanation, 303
SCIENCE 1468, 1469 (2004) ("Uncritical acceptance of authority-based opinions as conclusive
evidence is pervasive, even though top authorities unsuccessfully predict what scientific
knowledge will be preserved as 'fact."'). Dr. David Sackett explains that reliance on expert
medical opinions, which themselves are not based upon an objective methodology, poses a

jeopardy of improperly bestowing epistemic status upon uncertainties:
For the problems we're likely to encounter very infrequently ([for
example] ... a man who developed bad pneumonia while trying to reject
his heart-lung transplant), we "blindly" seek, accept, and apply the
recommendations we receive from authorities in the relevant branch of
medicine. This "replicating" mode also characterizes the practice of
medical students and clinical trainees when they haven't yet been
granted independence and have to carry out the orders of their
consultants. The trouble with the "replicating" mode is that it is "blind"
to whether the advice received from the experts is authoritative
(evidence-based, resulting from their [objective appraisal of evidence
consistent with "best evidence" methods]) or merely authoritarian
(opinion-based, resulting from pride and prejudice)... .If we tracked the
care we give when operating in the "replicating" mode into the literature
and [objectively] appraised it, we would find that some of it was
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the dogma in early nineteenth-century France that phlebotomies (bleeding of patients)
cured cholera.5 8 Until the 1980s, generations of doctors-persuaded by authorities
whose entire careers were devoted to proving that peptic ulcers were an acid
problem-administered milk and bland diets and performed selective vagatomies and
antrectomies only to be shown by a young resident, Barry Marshall, that the disease is

effective, some useless, and some harmful. But in the "replicating" mode

we'll never be sure which.
How TO PRACTICE AND TEACH EBM 5
(2d ed. 2000). Daniel Friedland and his co-authors compare "traditional" (authority-based) and
"evidence-based" assumptions as applied in medicine:
DAVID L. SACKETT ET AL., EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE:

Evidence-based medicine is a movement that has developed to help us make...
decisions with our patients systematically. This movement is represented by a
recent profusion of literature and course work in evidence-based medicine, and...
has been characterized as a paradigm shift.
The traditionalmedicalparadigm comprises four assumptions:
1. Individual clinical experience provides the foundation for diagnosis,
treatment, and prognosis. The measure of authority is proportional to the weight of
individual experience.
2. Pathophysiology provides the foundation for clinical practice.
3. Traditional medical training and common sense are sufficient to enable a
physician to evaluate new tests and treatments.
4. Clinical experience and expertise in a given subject area are a sufficient
foundation to enable the physician to develop clinical practice guidelines.
The new evidence-based medicine paradigm comprises a different set of
assumptions:
1. When possible, clinicians use information derived from systematic,
reproducible, and unbiased studies to increase their confidence in the true
prognosis, efficacy of therapy, and usefulness of diagnostic tests.
2. An understanding of pathophysiology is necessary but insufficient for the
practice of clinical medicine.
3. An understanding of certain rules of evidence is necessary to evaluate and apply
the medical literature effectively.
DANIEL J. FRIEDLAND ET AL., EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE: A FRAMEWORK FOR CLINICAL
PRACTICE 2 (Daniel J. Friedland ed., 1998) (emphasis in original). See also G. Rowe & George
Wright, Expert Systems in Insurance:A Review andAnalysis, in 2 INT'L J. INTELLIGENT SYS. IN

129 (1993) (Daniel E. O'Leary ed.) (concluding there is little evidence
that experts are more veridical than laymen in risk assessment); George Wright et al., An
Empirical Test of the Relative Validity of Expert and Lay Judgments of Risk, in 22 RISK
ANALYSIS 1107, 1118 (2002) (Elizabeth L. Anderson ed.) (finding that underwriters-risk
assessment experts-are little better at estimating certain risk measures than laypersons because
of lack of objective feedback); contra Paul Slovic et al., CharacterizingPerceived Risk, in
PERILOUS PROGRESS: MANAGING THE HAZARDS OF TECHNOLOGY 91-125 (R.W. Kates et al. eds.,
1985) (reaching opposite conclusions, but criticized by Wright et al., supra, for lack of
statistical power and for use of a heterogeneous panel of experts).
58. Paris clinician Pierre Louis dispelled this belief through systematic examination of
patients. See P. Ch. A. Louis, Researches on the Effects of Bloodletting in Some Inflammatory
Diseases (C. G. Putnam trans., 1835), reprinted in Researches on the Effects of Bloodletting in
Some Inflammatory Diseases Together with Researches on Phthisis (Morton D. Bogdonoffet al.
eds., 1986).
ACCT., FIN., AND MGMT.
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a bacterial infection. 59 More recently, a generation of well-meaning cardiologists put its
postmenopausal patients at risk of cancer and heart disease through estrogen treatments
that were widely and incorrectly believed, ironically, to reduce heart disease. 60 And in

59. Rachel K. Sobel, Barry Marshall:A Gutsy Gulp Changes Medical Science, U.S.

NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 20-27 2001, at 59, available at http://www.usnews.com/usnews/
doubleissue/heroes/marshall.htm.
60. David Herrington and Timothy Howard tout the newfound realization that this
untested hypothesis-turned-dogma could have been easily prevented:
During the past decade, postmenopausal hormone therapy became one of the most
frequently prescribed therapies in the United States, with a highly diversified
portfolio of presumed benefits for postmenopausal women. The belief that
hormone therapy might reduce a woman's risk of coronary heart disease
contributed considerably to its widespread use. Beginning in 1998, results from a
series of randomized clinical trials.., have clearly demonstrated that hormone
therapy does not slow the clinical or anatomical progression of established
coronary disease, nor does it prevent clinical cardiovascular events in previously
healthy women. Indeed, data from the Women's Health Initiative (WHI), in
conjunction with data from several other trials with clinical end points, suggest
that hormone therapy may even increase cardiovascular risk....
...The simple and intuitively appealing concept that replacing estrogen lost
during menopause would be beneficial was easy for both patients and physicians
to believe. This fact, coupled with impressive indirect evidence of a
cardioprotective effect and growing awareness of the need for effective means to
treat and prevent heart disease in women, made for a nearly unshakable belief in
the benefits of hormone therapy. As a result, many people suspended ordinary
standards of evidence concerning medical interventions and concluded that
hormone therapy was the right thing to prevent heart disease in millions of
postmenopausal women-despite the absence of any large-scale clinical trials
quantifying its overall risk-benefit ratio.
Not surprisingly, when the initial randomized clinical trials failed to show a
cardiovascular benefit, the results were heavily criticized and, in some cases,
disregarded in lieu of the less credible evidence that fit the prevailing
paradigm ....

The lesson is that belief, no matter how sincerely held, is no substitute for
proof .... Similarly, observational or mechanistic studies, animal models, and
basic research have tremendous value for the generation of hypotheses but should
not be used to justify broad-based pharmacologic interventions.
David M. Herrington & Timothy D. Howard, From PresumedBenefit to PotentialHarmHormone Therapy and Heart Disease, 349 NEw ENG. J. MED. 519, 519 (2003). See also Lars
Holmberg & Harald Anderson, HABITS (HormonalReplacement Therapyfor BreastCancerIs It Safe?), A Randomised Comparison:Trial Stopped, 363 LANcET 453 (2004) (randomized

trials ended because of unacceptable recurrence of breast cancer in women using estrogen
therapy), available at http://image.thelancet.com/extras/03let12260web.pdf. And as another
author observes, there were published indications as early as 1986 that would have offered an
evidence-based practitioner insight into the dubious value of estrogen therapy:
As long ago as 1986 Diana Petitti and colleagues showed that HRT was apparently
equally protective against accidental and violent deaths in an observational study
as it was against cardiovascular disease deaths. They pointed out that given the
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a most recent and shocking finding, the longstanding, universal application of
corticosteroids to patients with traumatic head injury, although indicated by seemingly
sound pathophysiological explanations to reduce brain swelling, has been shown in a
recent well-designed randomized trial to result in a sizeable increase in deaths. 61 This
unsettling discovery prompted editorialists to conclude that "administration of
corticosteroids to brain-injured patients has seemingly caused more than 10[,]000
is that applying
deaths during the 1980s and earlier ' 6' and that "[t]he key message..,
63
treatments with unproven effectiveness is like flying blindly."
Courts too are starting to see the need to divide risks and uncertainties. One federal
judge found that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, which first promoted the
now-accepted dogma that second-hand cigarette smoke causes lung cancer, had no
objective basis at the time for that proclamation. 64 Former Yale and Pennsylvania Law
dean and federal judge Louis Pollak preliminarily concluded only two years ago that
there was no objective basis for presenting "evidence" that a murder suspect's
fingerprints were identical to those later taken by authorities, despite a century of
and a professional requirement that multiple experts
fingerprinting's evidentiary 6use
5
examine each pair of prints.
Thanks to remarkable advances in informatics and database searchability, one can
now objectively judge much causal "knowledge" without relying on popular,
unfounded, or incompletely founded opinion. This method is referred to as "best
evidence" or "evidence-based logic" ("EBL"). Medicine, dentistry, engineering,
computer science, veterinary science, insurance companies and HMOs, 66 human
toxicology, 67 library science, 68 and even professional baseball 69 have adopted EBL to

lack of any biologically plausible link between HRT and these external causes of
death both associations should be suspected of suffering from residual
confounding.
Debbie A. Lawlor et al., Commentary: The Hormone Replacement-CoronaryHeartDisease
Conundrum:Is This the Death ofObservationalEpidemiology?,33 IN'r'L J. EPIDEMioLoGY 464,
466 (2004) (footnote omitted).
61. Stefan Sauerland & Marc Maegele, A CRASHLanding in Severe HeadInjury, 364
LANCET 1291 (2004).

62. Id. at 1291.
63. Id. at 1292.
64. Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop. Stabilization Corp. v. EPA, 4 F. Supp. 2d 435,465-66
(M.D.N.C. 1998) (rejecting EPA "research finding" that second-hand cigarette smoke causes
lung cancer for lack of objective evidence), vacated by 313 F.3d 852 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding
that issuance of report was not reviewable agency action).
65. Adrian Cho, FingerprintingDoesn 't Hold Up as a Science in Court, 295 SCIENCE
418 (2002). See also Exxon Corp. v. Makofski, 116 S.W.3d 176 (Tex. App. 2003) (conducting
preliminary EBL review to assess whether benzene contamination of aquifer caused plaintiffs'
ailments).
66. See Christopher P. Guzelian, Liability & Fear, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 713, 741-42 &
nn.84-89 (2004) (listing cites for evidence-based medicine, dentistry, engineering, computer
science, veterinary science, and insurance companies).
67. Guzelian et al., supra note 51.
68. Jonathan D. Eldredge, Evidence-BasedLibrarianship:An Overview, 88 BULL. MED.
LIBR. ASS'N 289 (2000).

2005]

THE KIND YNAMIC THEORY OF TORT

gauge what is "known" (i.e., an epistemic possibility) at a particular time. Elsewhere
this author, along with others, has set out a comprehensive overview of how EBL
functions in two contexts: human toxicology and medicine. 70 Here, it suffices to note
that EBL exists
and is the best method for objectively distinguishing risks and
7
uncertainties. 1
Admittedly, many regulatory agencies, public advocacy groups, crisis managers,
and safety experts advise that certain actions (such as evacuations, waste cleanups,
restricted product usage, etc.) be taken even if only a nomological possibility of harm
(i.e., an "uncertainty") exists. Journalists or government officials often warn about
uncertainties. 72 Such regulation, warnings, and reporting are defended by reference to
the precautionaryprinciple: better safe than sorry.73 The precautionary principle has
69. See MICHAEL LEWIS, MONEYBALL: THE ART OF WINNING AN UNFAIR GAME (2003)

(describing rudimentary EBL-style steps recently taken by the Oakland Athletics to maximize
chances of making the playoffs with the league's lowest-salaried roster).
70. For an instructive overview of EBL, see Guzelian et al., supra note 51.
71. Whether a single method for addressing generaland specific causation can exist is
open to the most basic epistemological debates. See Christopher Hitchcock, Probabilistic
Causation: Singular and General Causation, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY

(Edward N. Zalta ed., Fall ed. 2002) (citing specific/general causation dichotomy literature and
noting "we make at least two different kinds of causal claim, singular and general. With this
distinction in mind, we may note that... counter-examples... are all formulated in terms of
singular causation. So one possible reaction to... counter-examples ... would be to maintain
that a probabilistic theory of causation is appropriate for general causation only, and that
singular causation requires a distinct philosophical theory. One consequence of this move is that
there are (at least) two distinct species of causal relation, each requiring its own philosophical
account-not an altogether happy predicament."), availableat http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
causation-probabilistic/. EBL recognizes that this fundamental tension between specific and
general causation exists and attempts to resolve both forms of causation adequately, as courts
increasingly demand be done. See, e.g., Eskin v. Carden, 842 A.2d 1222, 1229-30 (Del. 2004)
(holding in case involving biomechanical expert testimony that "[e]xtrapolating from general..
.principles to demonstrative evidence that supports or disproves injury to an individual may not
be reliable in every case. We, therefore, hold that a trial judge may admit ... expert opinion that
a particular injury did (or did not) result from the forces of an accident only where the trial judge
determines that the testimony reliably creates a connection between the reaction of the human
body generally to the forces generated by the accident and the specific individual allegedly
injured or another determinative fact in issue.") (footnote omitted).
72. This observation should not be taken to mean that communicating uncertainties or
rare risks should be wholly disallowed. But the risk communicator must think about how his
audience is going to perceive the information he presents. If it is an uncertainty, the audience
must perceive it as that, not as a risk grounded in epistemic possibility. See Guzelian, supra note
66 (advocating that negligent risk communicators be assigned liability for clinically serious
emotional harms or fears caused by errant risk communication); see also Christopher P.
Guzelian, Scientific Free Speech (Working Paper 2005) (on file with author).
73. V. Dethlefsen et al., The Precautionary Principle: Towards Anticipatory
Environmental Management, in CLEAN PRODUCTION STRATEGIES 41 (Tim Jackson ed., 1993);
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION ON THE

PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE

3 (2000) (maintaining that some applications of the precautionary

principle are valid, but stressing "[r]ecourse to the precautionary principle presupposes that

potentially dangerous effects deriving from a phenomenon, product or process have been
identified, and that scientific evaluation does not allow the risk to be determined with sufficient
certainty"), availableat http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/cnc/2000/com2000_0001 en01 .pdf.
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critics; some say that it encourages wasteful, ad hoc expenditures on uncertainties at
74
the expense of efficient resource allocation toward reducing risks. The debate is an

74. Elizabeth Whelan, president of the American Council on Science and Health,
critiques the precautionary principle:
There are ...at least two reasons why the precautionary principle itself, when
applied in its extreme, is a hazard, both to our health and our high standard of
living.
First, if we act on all the remote possibilities in identifying causes of human
disease, we will have less time, less money and fewer general resources left to deal
with the real public health problems which confront us. This does not mean that
before we take prudent action to protect public health we have to dot every
scientific "i" and cross every environmental "t". It does mean that we should not
let the distraction of purely hypothetical threats cause us to lose sight ofthe known
or highly probable ones.
Second, the precautionary principle assumes that no detriment to health or the
environment will result from the proposed new banning or chemical regulation...
When we apply the precautionary principle and focus on hypothetical risks and
ponder what actions we might take "just in case", we leave the world of science
and enter the realm of ideology. We allow ourselves to come under the spell of
those who are motivated, for whatever reason, by a desire to return to what they
perceive as a pre-industrial Garden of Eden.
These "what if' ideologues need to be reminded that wealth and industrial
progress are associated with better, not worse health. Blanket applications of the
precautionary principle ultimately would mean rejecting the modem technologies
that have given us our enviable state of good health and longevity, and the
freedom to enjoy it.

Elizabeth M. Whelan, Too Much Safety Be Hazardous?A CriticalLook at the "Precautionary
Principle", AMERICAN COUNCIL ON SCIENCE AND HEALTH (May 23, 2000), at
http://www.acsh.org/healthissues/newsID.236/healthissue detail.asp. See also THOMAS R.
DEGREGORI, BOUNTIFUL HARVEST: TECHNOLOGY, FOOD SAFETY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT
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(2002) ("The precautionary principle is often defined as 'absence of evidence is not the same as
absence of risk.' What this really says is that the proponents of the principle have lost the
argument on the evidence (otherwise they would argue the evidence), so they argue that we
should follow their policy prescriptions anyway. Stated differently, if our fears and phobias are
right, we are right, but even if we are wrong, well we are still right: it's 'my policy, right or
wrong."'); BORN LOMBORG, THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST: MEASURING THE REAL STATE
OFTHE WORLD 258-324 (Hugh Matthews trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2001) (1998) (arguing
for evidence-based prioritization of resources toward "real" problems rather than nomological
possibilities for global warming); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (2002) (arguing that government agencies should predicate regulatory decisions
and prioritize expenditures on the basis of sound risk assessments); John D. Graham & Susan
Hsia, Europe's PrecautionaryPrinciple:Promiseand Pitfalls, 5 J. RISK RES. 371, 371 (2002)
(finding the European Commission's broad regulatory adoption of the precautionary principle
unsatisfactory and concluding that "[ciritical terms need to be defined, the evidentiary hurdles
for precaution need to be clarified, and checks and balances against ill-considered application of
the principle need to be strengthened. A systematic process of ranking hazards and targeting
cost-effective protection opportunities should be implemented by the EC as a counterweight to
enactment of precautionary measures on a crisis-by-crisis basis."); Gary E. Marchant, From
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interesting one, but which side has the better of it does not matter for common law tort
liability. 75 Because plaintiffs have a burden of proof to establish causality, only risks
(known causal possibilities) are relevant; the fact that a regulatory agency issued
sanctions or took "preventative" action against uncertainties because it was compelled
to by law does not demonstrate an established causal contribution (or lack thereof).76
To summarize the first major contribution of Kindynamic Theory: a properly
identified risk is (1) an epistemic causal possibility, (2) expressed as a quantified
probability/likelihood, (3) that results in a harm/injury. All other would-be "risk"
propositions are either uncertainties or impossibilities, and Kindynamic Theory asserts
that they cannot serve as a basis for liability.

IV. PROXIMATE

RISK AND NEGLIGENCE

Someone creates a risk. Someone is injured. Does the victim recover? Not
automatically. A negligence-based tort requires more than the mere creation of risk and
injury. But exactly which elements should factor into a finding of negligence (and thus,
liability) has resulted in intense debate without good resolution.
GeneralPolicy to Legal Rule: Aspirationsand Limitationsof the PrecautionaryPrinciple,Ill
ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1799, 1801 (2003) ("The ambiguity of the [precautionary principle]
invites arbitrary application, both with respect to which risks it is applied to and what it requires
when it does apply.") (citation omitted).
75. In his struggle to address the arbitrariness of the precautionary principle's
application, Gary Marchant has indirectly suggested a more refined set of classes ofpossibility
than those we described in Figure 2. Marchant, supra note 74. By extension of Marchant's
reasoning, uncertainties consist of two subclasses: (1) those that have arisen in some
individuals' imagination but remain empirically controverted ("hypotheses"), and (2) those that
have not yet even been dreamt up ("ignorance").See id. at 1800 ("It is difficult to see how the
[precautionary principle] can help address risks for which we are ignorant rather than
uncertain."). It is far from clear that Marchant's standard does anything to refine the
precautionary principle other than to state what is necessarily true: there is no possibility of
taking action against things we cannot even imagine. But see Paolo F. Ricci et al.,
PrecautionaryPrinciples:A Jurisdiction-FreeFrameworkforDecision-MakingUnderRisk, 23
HUM. &EXPERIMENTAL TOXICOLOGY 579 (2004) (presenting decision analysis framework that
offers reproducibility and formal structure for making precautionary decisions about
uncertainties).
76. See Philip S. Guzelian & Christopher P. Guzelian, Authority-Based Explanation,
303 SCIENCE 1468, 1469 (2004) ("It may be prudent for preventative purposes to act as if some
chemicals present health risks, but such decisions should never be confused with evidence-based
conclusions that such agents do cause harm."). And as Judge Richard Posner has said, "[flaw
lags science; it does not lead it." Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 1996).
See also Black v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 2d 592, 606 (S.D. W. Va. 1998) ("[T]he
Court cannot abdicate its role as 'gatekeeper' and subject the jury unfairly to confusing and
misleading 'pseudoscientific' research."); Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706,
727-28 (Tex. 1997) ("Courts should not embrace inferences that good science would not draw..
. . [T]he law should not be hasty to impose liability when scientifically reliable evidence is
unavailable."); Christopher P. Guzelian, Did DaubertRid Coutrooms ofAdvocacy Science?, in
Sci. Ev. REV. (7 th ed., Am. Bar Assoc., forthcoming 2005); Arnold J. Rosoff, Evidence-Based
Medicine and the Law: The Courts Confront ClinicalPracticeGuidelines, 26 J. HEALTH POL.,
POL'Y & L. 327 (2001) (advocating expanded use of evidence-based approach to separate
uncertainties from epistemic possibilities).
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Unlike regulatory agencies, 77 American courts have never systematicallyprioritized
tort claims. As has been observed in regulatory contexts, 78 without risk prioritization,
coherent risk deterrence does not occur. Accordingly, many Kindynamic theorists
contend that negligence must involve systematic risk prioritization.

77. See, e.g., ScI. ADVISORY BOARD, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SAB-EC-90-02 1,
REDUCING RISKS: SETTING PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 6
(1990) (encouraging EPA to "target its environmental protection efforts on the basis of
opportunities for the greatest risk reduction").
78. Richard B. Stewart, A New GenerationofEnvironmentalRegulation?,29 CAP. U.
L. Rv. 21, 50-51 (2001) ("[M]any commentators believe that lack ofappropriate risk analysis
and comparative risk prioritization represents the greatest obstacle to achieving sound
environmental regulation. They argue, with considerable justification, that without a sustained
effort to measure and compare risks, environmental regulation is little more than shooting in the
dark .. ") (footnote omitted).
79. Courts rarely bother to quantify risks (some even expressly refuse to). See, e.g., In
re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 788 (3d Cir. 1994) ("Paoli II") ("Nor do we think
that an expert must quantify the increased risk."); Merry v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 684 F.
Supp. 847, 850 (M.D. Pa. 1988) (criticizing a quantification of risk requirement because "[w]e
think this formulation unduly impedes the ability of courts to recognize that medical science
may necessarily and properly intervene where there is a significant but unquantified risk of
serious disease") (quoting Ayers v. Jackson Township, 525 A.2d 287, 309 (N.J. 1987)). They
rely instead on quantitative adjectives such as "substantial," "inconsequential," "trivial," or
"significant" to delimit which risks are judicially redressable. Such modifiers, absent supporting
quantification, are notoriously imprecise. They encourage both subjectivity and error; they
defeat any effort to sensibly risk prioritize. As this author has written elsewhere:
Quantitative adjectives lack precision and accuracy. Descriptors such as
"significant," ... "serious," "large," "small," "trivial," "meaningful," "substantial,"
"inconsequential," and so forth are simply ineffective standards for classifying risk
magnitudes unless backed by actual quantification. Say we wish to discuss a
particular level of risk. What level of risk is "significant"?...
The correct answer.., is "it depends." Quantitative adjectives only gain meaning
in a context. Is a quantitative adjectival "bright line" getting at a proportionate
risk increase ("[A] relative risk of 1.0 means that the agent has no effect on the
incidence of disease.... [A] relative risk of 2.0 implies a 50% likelihood that an
exposed individual's disease was caused by the agent."), an aggregatelevel of risk
("[a]sbestosis sufferers . . . have a significant (one in ten) risk of dying of
mesothelioma .... "), or both ("because of plaintiffs exposure to benzidine, his
risk of developing bladder cancer had increased from one in ten thousand to one in
ten")[?] In determining whether medical screening is advisable, for instance,
physicians focus only on aggregate risk; diagnostic decisions do not turn on the
source of risk, just that a threshold has been transgressed. However ....
fair
apportionment of [] liability . . . requires both aggregate and relative risk
considerations.
Guzelian, supra note 66, at 815-16 (emphases added). See also CHICKEN & POSNER, supra note

16, at 11 ("[A]ny precise discussion of the acceptability of a risk must describe the risk in
quantitative terms; if the risk is described only in soft, qualitative terms, any conclusions about
its acceptability will be equally soft or, to put it another way, will be merely uncertain
speculation."); SUNSTEIN, supranote 74, at Ill (suggesting that accounting for both quantitative
and qualitative aspects of risk is necessary for adequate risk assessment); Christopher P.
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One problem with an explicit move to a risk-prioritized tort system-in which
certain injury-resulting risks would not be judicially cognizable because they occur too
infrequently to merit judicial attention-is that courts are tasked (possibly as a
constitutional requirement) with dispensing individual justice injury-by-injury. Yet the
practical reality is that there is nothing superhuman about the judicial branch. It is
constrained by finite budgets, time, expertise, and staff (more so even than regulatory
agencies comprised of expert risk analysts). 80 Even while paying lip service to the
adage that "every man must have his day in court," tort law faces the reality that if
every alleged negligence-and-resulting-injury claim really had its day in court, the
system would buckle.
To maintain an illusion of individual justice, the current tort system has fashioned
81
an unprincipled haphazard set of rules to limit the number of cognizable injuries.
Take a specific example: a person within the "zone of danger" who witnesses his
daughter struck and killed by an automobile has an actionable claim (emotional
distress). But a plaintiff who witnesses his fiancee struck and killed in identical
circumstances cannot recover in some jurisdictions. This is not because the fianc6's
emotional distress is scientifically believed any less injurious and terrible than the
father's. Rather, it is because courts have set up a veiled, illogical patchwork of
prioritization rules that quietly eliminate certain classes of injuries, which in a world of
unlimited judicial resources might well be actionable. This patchwork prevents
while maintaining the false public belief that
administrative overload of the courts,
82
individual justice is being done.
Class action suits and the rise of so-called "enterprise liability" theory are recent
theoretical attempts to improve individual justice. Still, the take-home lesson is that
inability to ensure individual justice, regardlessof how much one cherishes that goal,
is an inherent aspect of any constrained judicial system where claims outpace
resources.
As we show in the following Parts IV(A) and (B), some Kindynamists contend that
within this administratively limited system ofjustice, better risk prioritization should,
must, and can be attained in tort law.
Guzelian et al., A QuantitativeMethodologyfor Determining the Needfor Exposure-Prompted
Medical Monitoring, 79 IND. L.T 57, 62 (2004) ("Judicial use of quantitative adjectives as a
proxy for assessing the actual increase in risk is a questionable practice. One pair of authors
observes that 'the court[s] self-consciously rel[y] on a series of quantitative modifiers.., in an
effort to reserve liability for truly deserving cases. Anyone familiar with modem American trial
practice will understand that, however well-meaning, this reliance on superlatives will not
prevent most well-prepared cases from reaching triers of fact."') (quoting James A. Henderson,
Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Asbestos Litigation Gone Mad: Exposure-Based Recovery for
IncreasedRisk, Mental Distress,and Medical Monitoring, 53 S.C. L. REV. 815, 845 (2002)).
80. See COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, WHO PAYS FOR TORT LIABILITY CLAIMS? AN
ECONOMIC

ANALYSIS

OF

THE

U.S. TORT LIABILITY

SYSTEM

(2002),

available at

http://www.whitehouse.gov/cea/tortliabilitysystem--apr02.pdf
81. For a related idea, see Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On
Acoustic Separationin CriminalLaw, 97 HARv. L. REv. 625 (1984) (contending that selective
transmission to the public of rules governing decisionmakers' adjudications is a questionable
practice).
82. See Guzelian, supra note 66, at 766-850 (describing the nonsensicality of fear and
emotional distress tort liability rules and proposing rules to sensibly prioritize emotional harm
claims).
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A. "Significant" Risks
Case-by-case regulation is an inefficient and possibly disadvantageous means for
risk deterrence.8 3 Nonetheless, common law tort is ingrained in American culture.
Abandoning it in favor of an administrative regime designed for risk prioritization
probably will not happen. But common law can still be tilted toward individual case
adjudication that is based on orderly risk prioritization. For any regulatory system,
Kindynamic Theory favors infusing whatever amount of risk prioritization is possible.4
It therefore expects courts to systematically decide whether a risk is "significant.0
Assessing whether a risk is "significant" proceeds according to a basic risk priority rule
(which we state first and then examine in detail immediately below):
A Kindynamically "Significant" Risk
The more an at-risk (and injured) plaintiff can establish that the risk he suffers is
1.
2.

one that results in judicially cognizable injury more frequently
relative to other risks ("injurious"risk); and
one for which comparatively more people or property are at
similar risk relative to other risks ("widespread"risk),

the greater should be the plaintiff's priority among would-be claimants for recovery. 5

83. As one academic states:
[J]udicial review may make problems of fragmentation and lack of consistency
worse by overlaying extensive legal procedures and case-by-case litigation on an
already unwieldy and fragmented legal and institutional apparatus. This overlay of
procedural formality and litigation makes many aspects ofthe U.S. environmental
regulatory system more costly and burdensome than the similar command-andcontrol systems of other advanced industrialized countries that achieve equivalent
levels of environmental protection.
Stewart, supra note 78, at 38 (footnote omitted).
84. As we will see in Part V, a risk must be "significant," according to Kindynamic
Theory, if the claim of "negligence" hinging upon that risk is to be cognizable. Furthermore,
even if a risk is "significant," it must also be net costly to lead to liability. See infra Part IV(B).
85. Sutcliffe v. G.A.F. Corp., 15 Phila. 339, 345-46 (1986). The court in Sutcliffe held
that:
[W]hen attempting to establish increased risk of harm ... by statistical
evidence, it is imperative that statistics be given for both the plaintiff and
for the average individual (the base rate). One without the other is of no
statistical or probative value since it would require sheer speculation as to
the missing statistic in attempting to determine the actual increase in risk
and whether such a risk is of sufficient significance ....
Id.
For fear or emotional distress liability assignments, an additional assumption that a
Kindynamic-minded jurist must make is to assert that the person placed at physical risk
perceives that risk. For additional details about this requisite supposition and the unique
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1. The Injurious Risk Threshold

The first step Kindynamic Theory takes to risk prioritize is to limit court access to
those plaintiffs whose defendant-caused8 6 risks are more likely to be injurious (i.e.,
result in the predicted injury) than other risks. Evidence-Based logic can usually nail
87
down what percentage of people at similar risk as the plaintiff do, in fact, sustain
injury. Thus, Kindynamic Theory envisions establishing an injurious risk cut-off for
each risk. Risks whose likelihoods of resulting in harm fall below this threshold are
88
generally are.
generally not cognizable; risks whose likelihoods surpass the threshold
There is a considerable problem with this rationale, however, which Kindynamic
Theory acknowledges: it is anything but clear at what level the injurious risk cut-off
should be set. Indeed, some natural rights philosophers reject any non-zero injurious
risk threshold, as philosopher Robert Nozick once explained:
[W]hat is the magnitude of the specified [injurious risk] value? The harm of the
least significant act (yielding only that harm for certain) that violates a person's
natural rights? This construal of the problem cannot be utilized by a tradition
which holds that stealing a penny or a pin or anything from someone violates his
rights. That tradition does not select a threshold measure of harm as a lower limit,
in the case of harms certain to occur. It is difficult to imagine a principled way in
which the natural-rights tradition can draw the line to fix which probabilities
impose unacceptably great risks upon others. This means that it is difficult to see
how, in these cases, the natural-rights tradition draws the boundaries [a threshold]
focuses upon.89
Thus, inherent philosophical tension between judicial pragmatism (explained at the
outset of this section) and this natural rights critique makes it difficult to set a
particular"injuriousness" level or range and even less obvious on what basis to do so.
To complicate matters further, the disutility of a particular injury may influence the
techniques necessary for addressing psychic injury claims, see Guzelian, supra note 66, at 75066.
86. The cumulative risk of a specific injury to a particular person usually results from an
aggregationof acts and circumstances, not just from one tortfeasor's act. For instance, the
cumulative risk ofcontracting leukemia from benzene exposure almost invariably presupposes
that there are multiple agents contributing as sources of that benzene exposure-the drycleaning shop around the comer, the large textile factory across town, and exposure to
background benzene residues-both natural and man-made. See Guzelian et al., supra note 79,
at 91-92 (indicating that a risk is the sum of the plaintiff's contribution plus the pre-exposure
incidence) (citing David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A
"'PublicLaw " Vision of the Tort System, 97 HAR. L. REv. 849, 855-56 (1984)). In setting the
injurious risk threshold, Kindynamic Theory focuses exclusively on the creation of or
augmentation in risk resulting from a defendant'sacts. It does not concern itself with cumulative
risk.
87. See Guzelian, supra note 51 (describing how specific delimiters can be used to
tailor general causal conclusions to an individual case).
88. There are at least three reasons for deviation from this general principle: (1) the
amount of disutility a particular risk's effect causes, on average, in injured victims (see
immediately below in this section); (2) how widespread the risk created by the individual
defendant is, see infra Part IV(A)(2); and (3) economic considerations, see infra Part IV(B).
89. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 75 (1974) (emphasis in original).
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particular injury cut-off. For instance, if the injurious risk cut-off is 5% for contracting
cancer, is the acceptable cut-off higher (e.g. 15%) for a less grievous harm (e.g.
destroying another's property)?
As the Supreme Court itself has come close to acknowledging, society can only
arbitrarilydelineate which risks to address and which to ignore. 90 Judges have to
decide what quantified aggregate level of risk for a specific harm they are
philosophically uncomfortable with permitting and set the corresponding quantified
injurious risk cutoff. 9' What Kindynamic Theory recommends is transparency:when
judges select a particular quantified injurious cutoff (or range), they should be explicit
in stating that level. As a result, the tenor and quality of policy debate as to whether
that cutoff is appropriate will vastly improve.
2. Widespread Risks
There is another reason the "injurious risk cutoff' is difficult to identify in practice:
it is a benchmark that is not necessarily the same as the cutoff set in any courtroom. For
instance, might we allow an actor to engage in certain behaviors whose likelihood of
causing risk exceeds the risk threshold (e.g., the threshold is 10%, the defendant's act
causes an 11% chance of harm)? Conversely, would we ever want to hold a specific
defendant liable even if the risk of physical harm he has created does not meet the risk
floor (e.g., the cutoff is 10%, the defendant's act causes an 8% risk of harm)?
Under Kindynanic Theory, establishing the "significance" of a risk incorporates
considerations beyond those that factor into setting the "injurious risk cut-off." One
cause for deviation from the injurious risk threshold is the number ofpeople or amount
of property a tortfeasor has placed at risk.92 Say, for instance, that tortfeasor A by his
careless actions has placed 100 people at risk of cancer, and that the fashion in which
he did is known by EBL to cause 11% of the same to contract cancer, where the
injurious risk cut-off is set at 10%. Assume tortfeasor B has negligently placed 100
million people at risk of cancer, and that EBL predicts 9% will contract cancer. On

90. See Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 655 n.62 (1980)
("[W]hile [a regulatory agency] must support its finding that a certain level of risk exists by
substantial evidence, we recognize that its determination that a particular level of risk is
'significant' will be based largely on policy considerations. At this point we have no need to
reach the issue of what level of scrutiny a reviewing court should apply to the latter type of
determination."). See also NoZICK, supra note 86, at 75 ("One might plausibly argue that
beginning with probabilities that may vary continuously and asking that some line be drawn
misconstrues the problem and almost guarantees that any position of the line (other than 0 or 1)
will appear arbitrary.").
91. See, e.g., Temple-Inland Forest Prods. Corp. v. Carter, 993 S.W.2d 88, 90 (Tex.
1999) (rejecting fear of asbestos-related illness claims of asymptomatic plaintiffs, even upon
accepting the testimony of an expert "that the chances of [plaintiffs'] developing a disease as a
result had increased from one in a million, which [the expert] estimated to be the risk that a
person would ever develop a disease from asbestos exposure not occupationally related, to about
one in 500,000 for the next ten or fifteen years, and as much as one in 100 over twenty or thirty
years.").
92. There are at least two other reasons to deviate from the theoretical threshold. See
supra note 88.
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average, A should cause 11 people to suffer the harm, but
93 B will cause 9 million people
to suffer the same. Should A be liable while B is not?
Following the current logic of many regulatory agencies, 94 the Kindynamic answer
is typically "no." Applying an aggregate cutoff equally to all physical injurers would
enable a behemoth injurer to escape liability simply because he doesn't meet the onesize-fits-all percentage threshold. An individual threshold (or range) must be
constructed along a sliding scale based on how many individuals a physical injurer puts
at risk, with the threshold serving only as the initial benchmark. This Kindynamic
concept is motivated by antitrust law, where some actions regarded as lawfully
"competitive" by companies with little market power (analogous to tortfeasors who put
few people or little property at risk) are unlawfully "monopolistic" when undertaken by
larger competitors (analogous to tortfeasors who put many people or much property at
95

risk).

Cutoffs set for an individual defendant can deviate in practice, sometimes
substantially, from the theoretical injurious risk threshold. Kindynamic Theory
suggests judges, however, first derive that cutoff, and then determine whether an
individual defendant's circumstances merit upward or downward departure. Only by
this method can one separate the distinct considerations that go into establishing the
aggregate and individual "significances" of a risk.
B. Excusing "Significant"Risks: Decision Analysis
Even if a defendant's act creates an individually "significant" risk, he sometimes
will be excused from liability because of cost-benefit considerations. Robert Nozick
explained:
[l1t might be decided that mining or running trains is sufficiently valuable to be
allowed, even though each presents risks to the passerby no less than compulsory
Russian roulette with one bullet and n chambers (with n set appropriately), which
is prohibited because it is insufficiently valuable. There are problems in ...

93. Assume that the cost-benefit ratios, scaled accordingly for the magnitude of each
injurer's act, are identical.
94. Curtis C. Travis et al., Cancer Risk Management: A Review of 132 Federal
Regulatory Decisions,21 ENVTL. ScI. & TECH. 415,419 (1987) (finding an inverse relationship
between the EPA and other regulatory agencies' injurious risk thresholds and the sizes of the atrisk populations).
95. Areeda and Hovenkamp, for example, define market power as "the ability to raise
price by restricting output." See generally PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, I1A
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION § 5A (2d ed.
2002). By analogy, a tortfeasor with "risk power" has the resources and means to put many
people in a society at risk by his act(s). Kindynamic Theory thus far has accommodated all
philosophical camps in assessing what the correct size of"society" is in considering the scope of
a risk. Some contend that local risk regulation is more effective. See, e.g., Richard A. Minard,
COMPARING ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS 23
JR., CRA and the States: History,Politics,andResults, in
(J. Clarence Davies ed., 1996). Others believe only a national (or international) integrated
approach can adequately address risk. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 508-17 (Peter S.
Menell & Richard B. Stewart eds., 1994). An answer to this debate may have to be borne out
over time.
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making ... these decisions.... The problems could lessen if the overall states
(totality below the threshold, and so on) can be reached by the operation of some
invisible-hand mechanism. But the precise mechanism to accomplish this has yet
to be described .... %
Learned Hand long ago popularized a rudimentary cost-benefit test. 97 A persistent
criticism of Hand's test (which Nozick recognized when he said that no "precise"
mechanism for such analysis exists) is its denomination of physical harms and
economic/property harms on a single monetized scale. 98 Kindynamic Theory mandates
use of "decision analysis," which avoids the problems of Hand's test, 99 but still
appropriately exonerates certain physical injurers from liability, even for some injurers
who have created "significant" risks to certain individuals.
Decision analysis is best understood through case examples, 00 but its conceptual
thrust is that it is a robust,'0 ' evidence-based, and widely accepted methodology used to

96. NoZICK, supra note 89, at 74.
97. See United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947) (holding that the
risk ofa defendant's conduct is calculated as a combination of(i) the magnitude of damage that
might occur; (ii) the probability that a certain magnitude of damage will occur).
98. See, e.g., Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence
Theory, 48 STAN. L. REv. 311, 346 (1996) ("[I]t is neither natural nor necessary to conceptualize
accident and precaution costs in economic terms."); Kenneth W. Simons, Negligence, 16 Soc.
PHIL. & POL'Y 52,80 (1999) (objecting that monetization ofphysical risks turns "moral analysis
into a bloodless form of calculation," but noting that such "qualitative" balancing as described
would avoid this problem).
99. Decision analysis allows quantification of estimated risk "losses" in terms of risk.It
is simultaneously capable of itemizing estimated monetary values for economic losses. But it
doesn't require that the analyst reduce risks and property harms to a singular monetary scale, as
Hand's formula necessarily must. In this fashion, decision analysis can contribute to
unprecedented judicial consistency and accuracy in gauging negligence without sacrificing
reflection on the "moral" nature ofmany injuries. Cf Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 120506 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding without conducting quantified decision analysis that handgun
manufacturers' distribution of guns to police departments, which ostensibly allows for easier
criminal access to used guns, "is outweighed by the health and safety interests of potential
victims of gun violence at the hands of prohibited purchasers"); Joseph L. Arvai et al., Testing a
StructuredDecision Approach: Value-FocusedThinkingfor Deliberative Risk Communication,
21 RiSK ANALYSIS 1065 (2001) (finding that focus group use of "value-focused thinking"--a
crude and sometimes non-quantitative form of decision analysis-can help to improve public
perceptions of risk).
100. See generallyDETLOF VON WINTERFELDT & WARD EDWARDS, DECISION ANALYSIS
AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH (1986) (explaining how to perform decision analysis); THE
PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS OF DECISION ANALYSIS (1983) (Ronald A. Howard & James
Matheson eds.); Jerome P. Kassirer et al., DecisionAnalysis: A ProgressReport, 106 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 275 (1987) (explaining that decision analysis in the clinical profession has
become more widely used and improved); Stephen G. Pauker & Jerome Kassirer, Decision
Analysis, 316 NEW ENG. J. MED. 250 (1987) (applying the principles of decision analysis to
patient care); Harold C. Sox, Jr., Decision Analysis: A Basic Clinical Skill?, 316 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 271 (1987) (commenting on problems with using decision anlaysis in the medical
context); Ronald A. Howard et al., The Decision to Seed Hurricanes,176 SCIENCE 1191 (1972)
(using decision analysis to help determine whether seeding hurricanes would be worthwhile).
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determine whether leaving an act unaltered is relatively less socially costly than
modifying the act so as to mitigate some or all of the act's associated "significant"
risks. Stated formally, a defendant has no liability if the expected net socialcost 0 2 after
any feasible modification to his act is higher than the expected net social cost of
leaving the act unchanged. (Conversely, if some viable modification would have made
the act less costly, the actor is liable.) Purely for simplicity, we will consider only an
act's costs, not its benefits. 0 3 This simplifying assumption means that individual
liability exists whenever the modified act's expected total social cost is less than the
unaltered act's expected total social cost.' 04
101. Stephen G. Pauker, Deciding About Screening, 118 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 901
(1993) ("A formal decision analysis can help structure the problem, organize data, elucidate
tradeoffs, and estimate benefits and costs."). Decision analysis has been shown in medicine to be
a particularly helpful alternative to conducting costly and time-consuming controlled clinical
trials when a physician wishes to assess whether a proposed medical intervention is more likely
to be of benefit than of harm to patients. See Peter Doubilet & Barbara J. McNeil, Clinical
Decisionmaking, 23 MED. CARE 648, 648 (1985) ("Decision analysis is most applicable to
clinical questions that cannot be answered by appealing directly to the results of clinical trial or
to a large database. This can occur because no trial has been carried out or because the patient in
question differs substantially from the populations in existing sources of data."). As such,
decision analysis's predictive power is directly translatable to determining negligence. It could
be used to predict whether modification or elimination of an act that has caused harm is socially
preferable to the alternative of allowing the act to proceed unchanged.
102. "Net social cost" is measured by subtracting "total social costs" (the social
disutility suffered from a defendant's act, see infra note 104) from "total social benefits" (the
social utility gained from a defendant's act). A person causing a significant risk is negligent
whenever a modification could have been made to the underlying act that would have resulted in
a relative decrease in net social cost. Thus, it is theoretically possible that the "net social cost" is
positive (i.e. a net social benefit), yet a person is still negligent.
103. This assumption obviously need not be true in reality. A modification or
elimination of an act could have disparate impacts on social benefits and social costs associated
with it. Decision analysis is fully capable of addressing both. Dobbs explains well why one
makes this assumption: "The usefulness or [benefit] ofconduct actually includes the costs saved
by not adopting some other course ofconduct, but it is sometimes clearer if [benefit] and cost of
greater safety are stated separately." 1 DOBBS, supra note 6, § 144 at 338 n.5 (2001).
104. A "total social cost" is derived for both the unaltered act and each proposed
modification of that act. The "total social cost" associated with the unmodified act ("TCa ") is a
vector of all "n" significant risks ("Ri") along with a vector of all "in" property damages, ("Pj"):
TCact=Ri+Pj, ie{1.n},jE{1.m}
Assuming only for notational simplicity that the defendant would suffer no transactional (out-ofpocket) financial costs by being forced to modify his act, the "total social cost" ("TCad") of
each proposed and EBL-justified modification of the act is expressed similar to the unmodified
total social cost equation above, but the number and magnitudes of some or all of the associated
"significant" risks must be assessed for each modification and are not necessarily the same
across modifications. Thus, proposed modification number 1 might have s "significant" risks
associated with it, and t property costs, and so on for every other possible modification. (The
vector sizes of the modifications may or may not be equal to the vector sizes of the unmodified
act. There is no way of universalizing how a modification will affect the number of significant
risks, or the number of different property damages.) The final EBL-known modification, the zh
possible modification, has u "significant" risks associated with it, and v property costs:
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An act's total social cost can actually increasewhen one tries to reduce a particular
risk. This is because of "risk covariance":eliminating the "significance" of one risk
can make another "significant."' 5 For example, designing a street-corner lamp pole to
collapse easily in a vehicular collision decreases the risk of injury to drivers, but the
modification may simultaneously convert a previously insignificant risk of injury to
nearby pedestrians into one that is significant.'0 6 Modifications, however, do not
always cause other risks to become significant. Bailing water out of a flooded lifeboat
reduces the risk of drowning, but does not increase the risk
into the ocean substantially
07
of coastal flooding.'
Decision analysis, in sum, promises to elucidate tradeoffs and offers effective risk
minimization and avoidance without suffering the sustained criticisms that cost-benefit
computations that set all losses in economic terms do.

V.

KINDYNAMIC DEFINITIONS: PROXIMATE RISK, NEGLIGENCE, DUTY

Kindynamic Theory, based on the principles set out in the previous sections, can
offer rigorous definitions of proximate cause, negligence (breach), and duty that have
been lacking so greatly.' 08 The reader will observe that these Kindynamic definitions
are quite formal, as they must be when incorporating the precise concepts of risk and a
risk's "significance" discussed in Sections III and IV.

TC m o d Il

TCmodz

Rk +

{ ...
s},I
!!,k e fl

Ra + b, a

E

{1.u},b

t
{ ....

E {1.

v}

.Observe from this process that it is still possible to reduce the expected utilities of a risk to a
common scale, as Hand did. The power of decision analysis is that that computation is not
required; one has the ability to tabulate risks in risk-terms, rather than to monetize them.
105. See generally RISK VERSUS RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (John D. Graham, Jonathan B. Wiener, & Cass R. Sunstein eds.) (1997)
(contending that risk covariance is ubiquitous).
106. Bernier v. Boston Edison Co., 403 N.E.2d 391 (Mass. 1980) (concluding that
pedestrian risk of injury became too significant and hence defendant was negligent for designing
breakaway pole to protect drivers).
107. See Indiana Consolidated Ins. Co. v. Mathew, 402 N.E.2d 1000 (Ind. Ct. App.
1980) (finding no negligence where defendant immediately fled plaintiff's garage after mower
caught fire instead of pushing mower outside first, because the expected risk of harm to the
garage was less than the expected risk of injury tending to a potentially explosive mower
marginally longer).
108. Kindynamic definitions are partly motivated by Ludwig Triger's "most clairvoyant
person" rule. See LUDWIG TRAGER, DER KAUSALBEGRIFF IMSTRAF- UNDZIVILRECHT (1904). This

author has discussed this rule elsewhere in detail. See Christopher P. Guzelian, Liability & Fear,
65 OHIO ST. L.J. 713, 777-804 (2004). Under the Kindynamic adaptation of Triger's rule,
liability should attach if the risk (a) is recognizable under EBL at the time the event occurred;
and (b) taking into account any additional knowledge the alleged tortfeasor has. Condition (b) is
not usually applicable but may have relevance for, say, individuals with classified or secret
information.
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Proximate Cause ("Proximate risk"). A proximate cause ("proximate risk") is
(i) a risk associated with an act that should have been mitigated at the time the act
occurred because (ii) the risk is "significant" and (iii) the net social cost, if the act
had been modified so as to counteract this particular risk, would have been less
than the unaltered act's net social cost.
The definition is a mouthful, but if we break it down into its three enumerated parts,
it is sensible.
(i) Risk. Proximate cause is a kind of risk, verified as an epistemic possibility by
EBL (see Part III, supra). Proximate cause is also a form of negligence(which, we will
see in the next definition below, is a set of risks). 109 Negligence exists even if there is
only exactly one risk that meets its definitional conditions. Not coincidentally, that is
also the definition of a proximate cause, which can therefore be thought of as the
"weakest" form of negligence.' 1 0
Furthermore, beware: proximate cause (or negligence in general) is not an act (a
human-prompted stimulus). It is a risk associated with an act.I"' Courts and scholars,
beginning with then-Judge Cardozo,tt 2 have often made this mistake.'" 3 The distinction
may seem semantic, inasmuch as an act must occur for a risk to exist. Yet it is
necessary because examining the "act" usually regresses to considering only the
defendant's conduct. This deprives scrutiny of the context in which that act occurred

109. Dobbs suggests that proximate cause-"a rule limiting liability for risk to the
scope of the risk"--is properly viewed "as a corollary to or even a part of the basic rule of
negligence." DOBBS, supra note 6, § 181 at 446. In fact, the rigorous Kindynamic definition
permits us to go one better: proximate cause is always a kind of negligence.
110. Notice, however, the implicit prerequisite to proximate cause that is not imposed
on negligence generally: for proximate cause to exist, not only must it be the case that it is
generally"possible" for the particular risk of harm to cause injury, it must have done so in the
particular instance. Thus, the legal issue of "specific scientific causality" ("specific cause in
fact") must be resolved before proximate cause can be.
111. True, a person cannot have created or perpetuated a risk without committing an act
or omission. But this is not the same as saying the act is the proximate cause (or negligence).
Even if zebras were the only creatures with stripes, this does not mean a zebra is a stripe.
112. See Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928)
[O]ne who drives at reckless speed through a crowded city street is guilty of a
negligent act and therefore of a wrongful, one irrespective of the consequences.
Negligent the act is, and wrongful in the sense that it is unsocial .... If the same
act were to be committed on a speedway or a race course, it would lose its
wrongful quality. The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be
obeyed, and risk imports relation ....
113. Hernandez v. Trawler Miss Vertie Mae, Inc., 187 F.3d 432, 437 (4th Cir. 1999)
("[I]t is well understood that negligence is 'conduct which falls below the standard established
by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm."' (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965) (emphasis added)). Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp.,

447 A.2d 539, 544 (N.J. 1982) ("negligence is conduct-oriented, asking whether defendant's
actions were reasonable .... ).
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and jeopardizes rigorous assessment of whether the risk associated with the act is both
epistemic and "significant." ' 1 4 Although then-Judge Cardozo himself made this mistake
distinguished speedy drivers on a
in Palsgraf he was on the right track when he
1 5
racetrack and those on a crowded public street.
(ii & iii) "Significant"Risk & DecisionAnalysis (Cost-Benefit Analysis). For a
risk associated with an act to also be a proximate cause, it must be both "significant"
and inexcusable by decision analysis. The aim of these requirements, consistent with
the "significant risk" principle set out in the introduction to Section IV (see supra text
accompanying note 74), is to prioritize risk deterrence and address the most socially
costly, inexcusable risks first.
We make two other observations about proximate causes. First, a plaintiff must
identify the proximate cause. Proximate causes are therefore always litigatedrisks.
Second, litigators and judges should use the expression "proximate risk," rather than
the misnomer "proximate cause," to avoid continued confusion with scientific
causation-both in its general and specific forms. 1 6 We will do so ourselves
henceforth.
Negligence. "Negligence" is a subset of all risks that are associated with an act.
Specifically, it is any subset {A} of risks that should have been mitigated at the
time the act occurred because (i) the risk(s) in {A} was/were significant and (ii)
the net social cost, if the act had been so modified as to counteract any significant
risk(s) in {A}, would have been less than the unaltered act's net social cost.
Negligence is a particular kind of set of risks ("negligent risks") associated with an
act.11 7 For negligence to exist, atleast one risk must be "significant," and an aggregate
decision analysis (see supra Part IV.B) must show that leaving the act unaltered has a
greater total social cost than eliminating or abating some or all "significant" risks."'

114. See Guzelian, supra note 51 (discussing how to form necessary "delimiters" so that
risk propositions are properly stated).
115. Judges sometimes create categorical duty "rules," such that an act is presumptively
wrongful, no matter what its context. In the limit, these rules blur negligence with strict liability.
For instance, dynamite blasting is categorized as an "ultrahazardous" activity-harms resulting
from it are presumptively recoverable. See Garden of The Gods Vill., Inc. v. Hellman, 294 P.2d
597, 600 (Colo. 1956) ("Where damage to property is done by vibration or concussion from
blasting operations ... there is liability irrespective of negligence .... [P]roof of negligence is
unnecessary to establish liability."). See also Palsgraf,162 N.E. at 100 (Cardozo, J.) ("Some
acts, such as shooting are so imminently dangerous to any one who may come within reach of
the missile however unexpectedly, as to impose a duty of prevision not far from that of an
insurer."). This author has misgivings about the widespread invocation of categorical duty rules,
particularly in the context of fear, but that topic is beyond the scope of this article.
116. See supra note 109.
117. Some acts or omissions may have no known negligent risks associated with them at
a given time. Understand, however, it is never permissible to pronounce such acts as
"definitively" non-negligent. Because risk knowledge is a product of time and humanity's
collective knowledge, uncertainties that are not known risks today may become so tomorrow.
118. Aggregate decision analysis proceeds much the same as decision analysis would
for proximate risk. The only change is that aggregate decision analysis considers whether act
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The traditional judicial concept of negligence says that an individual is still
"negligent," even if the negligent risks associated with his conduct are not the ones
being litigated." 9 Thus, a defendant could be negligent, but be exonerated from
liability because he has not created a proximate risk (which is a litigatedrisk).
Identifying all negligent risks associated with a conduct is not necessary in practice.
Instead, one should simply ask whether the litigated risk is a proximate risk. If the
answer is no, there is no need to discuss negligence - the claim can be dismissed for
want of proximate risk. If instead proximate risk exists, so too does the minimal form

of negligence. 120
Duty. (i) Duty exists for a defendant in a negligence-based cause of action if a
reasonable jury could find negligence and proximate risk, (ii) unless there exists an
ulterior policy motivation, unrelated to negligence and proximate risk, that compels
the conclusion that liability should not attach to a defendant, (iii) Duty likewise
exists, even if no reasonable jury could find negligence or proximate risk, (iv) if
there exists an ulterior policy motivation, unrelated to negligence and proximate
risk, that compels the conclusion that liability should attach to a defendant.

There is a hugely important difference between "duty" and the former two
definitions: duty is judge-determined, but "negligence" and "proximate risk" are often
jury questions.12 ' Defining duty rigorously, therefore, is vital for judicial procedure.
Duty in a negligence-based action arises in one of two fashions. Per part (i) of our
definition, to decide whether the issue is suited for a jury (and hence, whether a duty

modification to avoid any set of significant risks (not necessarily the litigatedrisk(s)) would be
net socially beneficial.
119. Dobbs gives a fine example of this conception of negligence:
[S]uppose the defendant parks his car on the street, parallel to the curb, in a
no-parking zone. This conduct is negligent because it runs the [significant]
risk that traffic will be impeded, but leaving a car parked in a no-parking
zone does not negligently create a risk of injury to an able bodied
pedestrian. Courts are likely to say that the driver is not a proximate cause
of the pedestrian's harm from walking into the car, even though other risks
made it negligent to park the car in such a way.
DOBBS, supra note 6, § 181 at 446.
120. This is because a proximate risk is a "significant" risk not exemptable by decision
analysis. Such a risk, if it exists, also meets negligence conditions (ii) and (iii) stated above,
meaning there is a set of negligent risks: a set with at least one element (the proximate risk).
This technique yields only the "weakest" form of negligence: only one negligent risk has been
proven to exist. Observe that asking about the litigatedrisk(s) first will also avoid the similarly
Sisyphean task of identifying every risk associated with a particular act. One simply asks
whether the litigatedcausal proposition is epistemically possible.
121. See generallyDOBBS, supra note 6, § 225 at 577 ("The most significant identity of
limited or no-duty rules and immunity rules is that they are determined by judges or legislatures,
not by juries. That is an enormous contrast with the negligence issue, which is a jury
determination whenever reasonable people can differ.").
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exists), ajudge makes his own preliminary conclusion whether a reasonable jury could
find proximate risk and negligence.
But as part (ii) of our definition states, there is a notable exception to this general
rule. Courts are sometimes motivated by policy considerations to say that "no duty
exists," despite the fact that a reasonable jury could find negligence and proximate
risk. 122 What are these considerations? They can be nearly anything courts believe
should affect liability that are not part of typical liability assessment (i.e. negligence,
proximate risk, scientific cause, and injury determination). For example, the financial
solvency of the defendant or a class of defendants,123 the existence of a special
relationship between litigating parties,124 the youthful age of a defendant, 25 the scope
of a governing statute (where applicable), 26 the illegality or immorality of the tortious

122. Courts weighing duty have been remarkably lax in failing to separate negligence
and proximate risk considerations-typically reserved forjuries-from extra-negligence factors.
Rather, many courts heap negligence-related and extra-negligence factors together in a confused
mass that makes duty appear increasingly like ajury question, rather than the question of law it
is. See DoBBs, supra note 6, § 229 at 583 ("[Duty] factors are so numerous and so broadly
stated that they can lead to almost any conclusion.... [H]owever, they are mainly the very same
factors that determine the negligence question. Yet when the question is phrased as a question of
duty, the judge, not the jury, will be the decision maker, even on such quintessential jury issues
as foreseeability."). Consider, for example, the factors that are to be weighed under California's
test of duty:
(1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, (2) the
foreseeability of harm to him, (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered
injury, (4) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the
injury suffered, (5) the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, (6) the policy
of preventing future harm[,] and (7) effective judicial administration,, including
guarding against limitless liability.
Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 379 P.2d 513, 522 (Cal. 1963), overruledby Dillon v.
Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968) (rejecting Amaya 's holding, but not its duty factors). Factor 1
assesses whether the tort case is based in negligence. Factor 2 is akin to negligence's
foreseeability prong. Factor 3 touches on actual causality and certainty of injury, two other
traditional requirements for recovery. Factor 4 is a vague description of proximate cause. Factor
5 is a vague factor that could represent effectively anything, but if reduced to an "economic" set
of considerations, represents the cost-benefit prong in the definition of negligence. Factor 6 is
related to the "significance" prong of the negligence definition. Thus, only Factor 7-judicial
administrative ease and curbing the risk of a litigation flood-appears to be a purely "extranegligence" consideration.
123. See Christopher Guzelian, Liability & Fear, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 713, 849 (2004).
124. Lough by Lough v. Rolla Women's Clinic, 866 S.W.2d 851, 854 (Mo. 1993)
("[I]n determining existence of a duty,.., a relationship between the parties where one is acting
for the benefit of another ... plays a role.").

125. Except where children are engaged in adult activities (such as driving), courts
typically hold that children under the age of six or seven are conclusively presumed to lack
sufficient risk comprehension to be held liable. See Price v. Kitsap Transit, 886 P.2d 556 (Wash.
1994).
126. This concept-that no rule is intended to remedy each type ofconceivable loss or
harm-has been advocated particularly in the German civil law system, which refers to it as
"Normzweck" ("Legal Purpose"). See e.g., J.G. WOLF, DER NoRMzwEcK tN DEuKTsREcHT. EINE
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128
conduct, 27 social custom,
or any combination of the above' 29 have been such extra0
negligence factors.13
The second form of duty (Elements (iii) and (iv)) is assessed independent of
negligenceor proximate risk considerations.Intentional tort and strict liability duties
often take this form, as do some categorical duty rules in negligence cases that are
motivated by extra-negligence factors, such as special relationships.

VI. JOINT TORTFEASOR LIABILITY

A final contribution of Kindynarmic Theory is that it is the first tort theory to
objectively allocate liability for a single injury among multiple alleged tortfeasors. We
report on how it does so in the following two subsections.
A. Enabling Tort
Liability usually involves two parties: an injured plaintiff ("7t") and a tortfeasor (call
him the "Secondary" ("2°")). This traditional liability arrangement appears as:

DISKUSSIONSBEITRAG (1962); E. VON CAMMERER, DAS PROBLEM DES KAUSALZUSAMMENHANGE
IMRECHTE, BESONDERS IMSTRAFREcHTE (1956). But see Kernan v. Am. Dredging Co., 355 U.S.

426 (1958) (holding defendant liable where his tug carried a kerosene lamp closer to the water
than the required 8-foot minimum and exploded upon entering petroleum-laden waters, even
though statutory prescription was only intended to prevent collisions).
127. Zysk v. Zysk, 404 S.E.2d 721, 722 (Va. 1990) ("A party who consents to and
participates in an immoral or illegal act cannot recover damages from other participants for the
consequence of that act." (quotingMiller v. Bennett, 56 S.E.2d 217, 218 (Va. 1949))). But see
Doe v. Roe, 841 F. Supp. 444, 447 n.8 (D.D.C. 1994) (condemning Zysk's categorical bar
because it ostensibly frustrates efforts to deter the spread of sexually transmitted diseases).
128. See Richard Epstein, The Path to T.J. Hooper: The Theory and History ofCustom
in the Law of Tort, 21 J. LEG. STUDIES 1 (1992) (theorizing which classes of defendants should

be made liable under social custom).
129. See e.g., Burgess v. Superior Court, 831 P.2d 1197, 1200-01 (Cal. 1992) (finding
the duty supporting a direct victim negligent infliction of emotional distress case can have three
alternative origins: (1) it can be a duty assumed by defendant, or (2) it can be a duty imposed on
defendant by law, or (3) it can be a duty arising out of a preexisting relationship between
defendant and plaintiff).
130. Because it is commonly accepted that judicial administrative ease should not come
at the expense of individual justice, it is not usually explicitly cited as an extra-negligence
factor. See John C.P. Goldberg, 20th Century Tort, 90 GEO. L.J. 513, 534 (2002) ("The abstract
idea of"policy" [or "administrability"]-for which no criteria have been developed-can just as
readily support decisions to limit or not limit particular forms of negligence liability. Even if
rendered adequately determinate, it often seems unable to explain limits on negligence
liability.").
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Figure 3
Traditional Tort
Negligence/
Intent

Stanford Professor Robert Rabin, however, has described an important shift, which
he calls "enabling tort," in how the common law assigns negligence-based liability:"'
[Enabling tort] comes to full flowering in our risk-saturated closing decades of the
twentieth century-an epoch in which our perceptions of hazards in the
neighborhood, workplace, and environment have reached unprecedented heights.
In this milieu, blameworthiness is not so readily confined as was the case in times
past. Beyond the immediate perpetrator of harm, the victim perceives the
individual, or more often,
32 the enterprise, that set the stage for the suffering that
unfolded. The Enabler.1
Blaming Enablers adds a third, fourth, or more parties to the liability dance,
depending on how far we want to extend "reachback" liability. Rabin observes the
Enabler does not himselfcommit the final act leading to injury,' 33 but is still liable for
bolstering another's tortious risk.' 34 Assuming there is one "Enabler" (we will

131. Robert L. Rabin, Enabling Torts, 49 DEPAuL L. REV.435 (1999). This shift was
actually predictedfirst by Hart and Honor6. See H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORt, CAUSATION IN

THE LAW 284 (2d ed. 1985) ("[T]he law is in a transition from a stage at which liability was
based almost exclusively on negligently causing harm to one in which it is based not merely on
causing harm but also on exposing others to a risk of harm by providing other persons or things
with the opportunity of doing harm. Probably the future will see a considerable extension of the
latter form of liability."). See also LEONARD TALMY, TOwARD ACOGNITIVE SEMANTICs 504-09

(2000) (describing same).
132. Rabin, supra note 131, at 437-38.
133. Thus, enabling torts are not the same as "legally concurrent" causes of injury. See
Watts v. Smith, 134 N.W.2d 194 (Mich. 1965) (plaintiff suffering an indivisible injury in two
unrelated car crashes on the same day can recover jointly and severally from the unrelated
tortfeasors).
134. Rabin, supra note 131, at 450 ("[T]he essential element in enabler responsibility is
that a dangerous 'instrumentality' has been put in the hands of a third-party with a foreseeable

expectation that a 'remote' victim will suffer harm."). Rabin's requirement that victims be
"remote" (i.e. "innocent") has been relaxed in many circumstances. For example, in recent
tobacco suits, individual smokers have been able to recover, despite their own complicity in
smoking, because of negligent or intentional concealment by the tobacco industry of internally
generated "addiction" data. See, e.g., Whiteley v. Phillip Morris, Inc., II Cal. Rptr.3d 807 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2004). Criminal law too has assigned liability for those who negligently assist suicide
victims. See, e.g., People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W. 2d 714 (Mich. 1994).
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symbolize him as the "Primary" ("1")) demands modification of Figure 3's traditional
liability scheme as follows:
Figure 4
Facilitated Tort
Strict Liability/
Negligence!
Intent

Negligence/
Intent

Observe that the generalform enabling tort takes--facilitatedtort" is not new.
For example, law penalizes intentionalfacilitation of a crime (think of conspiracy), 135
and manufacturers are strictly liable36for defective product designs, even if another
person is the direct cause of injury. 1
Conversely, enabling tort-that class of facilitated torts in which an Enabler suffers
negligence (as the term is customarily used)-has
liability when it is specifically his
37
only recently begun to emerge: 1

135. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(a) (1962)

A person is guilty ofconspiracy with another person or persons to commit a crime
if with the purpose of promoting or facilitating its commission he: (a) agrees with
such other person or persons that they or one or more of them will engage in
conduct that constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit such
crime; or (b) agrees to aid such other person or persons in the planning or
commission of such crime or of an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime.
136. For example, handgun manufacturers have been sued under strict liability theories
for failure to put trigger-locks on their guns. Compare Turley & Harrison, Strict Liability of
Handgun Suppliers, 6 HAMLINE L. REV. 285 (1983) (proposing strict liability for handgun
manufacturers under the product liability principles of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
402A (1964)), with Martin v. Harrington and Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1206 & n.2 (7th
Cir. 1984) (Cudahy, J., concurring) (discussing possible strict liability of handgun
manufacturers under the ultrahazardous activity principles of Restatement (Second) ofTorts §§
519-520 (1976)). See also Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298 (Cal. 1994) (holding auto
manufacturer liable for injuries resulting from "defective" wheel and floorboard mounting when
driver was struck by another driver who careened out of control).
137. Traditional tort law did not hold Enablers liable. Oliver Wendell Holmes rejected
negligence-based Enabler liability in a famous law review article, Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Privilege,Malice andIntent, 8 HARv. L. REv. 1, 10 (1894). ("The principle seems to be pretty
well established, in this country at least, that every one has a right to rely upon his fellow-men
acting lawfully, and, therefore, is not answerable for himself acting upon the assumption that
they will do so, however improbable it may be."). Recognizing that his rule would provide too
much shield from liability for certain Primaries, Holmes conceded that liability could be
assessed against a Primary if"he intended to bring about consequences to which that unlawful
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Figure 5
Enabling Tort
Negligence/
Intent

Negligence

10

20

Injured

The traditional prohibition on negligence-based "enabler" liability is ending. A
century after Oliver Wendell Holmes specifically rejected enabler liability for handgun
manufacturers, 13' Rabin's chief example of enabling tort is recent (sometimes
successful 1 39 ) litigation against the handgun industry. The enabling theory is that these

act was necessary." Id. at 11. Intent was Holmes's dividing line for facilitator liability. This
means he categorically rejected enabling tort.
Criminal law, in contrast, has already shifted to an "enabling model"; often it condemns
negligent enabling acts where the Secondary tortfeasor commits a crime. Kevorkian, 527
N.W.2d at 738 n.70 ("[T]here may be circumstances where one who recklessly or negligently
provides the means by which another commits suicide could be found guilty of a lesser offense,
such as involuntary manslaughter." (citing People v. Duffy 595 N.E.2d 814 (N.Y. 1992))
(emphasis added)). See also Persampieri v. Commonwealth, 175 N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1961)
(convicting husband of manslaughter after taunting drunken and possibly suicidal wife and
showing her location of and means to use handgun); State v. Bier, 591 P.2d 1115 (Mont. 1979)
(upholding husband's negligent homicide conviction for placement of gun near drunken wife
who committed suicide); Zinck v. Whelan, 294 A.2d 727, 730 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972)
("A substantial and growing number ofjurisdictions, though still a minority, have held, in the
ordinary fact case of theft [of car keys] and accident within a reasonable time thereafter that
there are at least jury questions as to duty, negligence, and proximate cause [of a negligent car
owner] ....
").
But see Mays v. City of East St. Louis, 123 F.3d 999, 1003 (7th Cir. 1997) ("A
person whose negligence just sets the stage for a criminal act generally is not liable for ensuing
injury. For example, a person who negligently leaves a car unattended, with the keys in the
ignition, is generally not liable to a person injured by a thief driving the car."); Wise v. Superior
Court, 272 Cal- Rptr. 222 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (finding, in the absence of a special duty, that
wife of a sniper who shot plaintiff from his roof is not liable for her failure to warn plaintiff
about her husband).
138. Holmes posed an "enabling tort" hypothetical in 1894 that must strike an eerily
prophetic note with a modem crowd when he wrote: "[W]hy is not a man who sells fire-arms
answerable for assaults committed with pistols bought of him, since he must be taken to know
the probability that, sooner or later, someone will buy a pistol of him for some unlawful end?"
Holmes, supra note 137, at 10 (concluding that the gun manufacturer shouldn't be liable).
139. Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding duty under negligent
distribution theory); NAACP v. AcuSport, Inc., 271 F. Supp.2d 435, 490-91 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)
(rejecting liability on other grounds, but acceding that "a duty of care could be imposed on gun
manufacturers where there [i]s a 'tangible showing that defendants were a direct link in the
causal chain that resulted in plaintiffs' injuries and ...
defendants were realistically in a position
to prevent the wrongs."' (quoting Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1062
(N.Y. Ct. App. 2001))); Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp.2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (awarding
damages under negligent distribution theory). But cf McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148 (2d
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corporations share responsibility for handgun deaths and injuries
as a result of
0
conscious or negligent oversupply of markets with lax gun laws.14
1 41
Other enabling torts have recently emerged: second-hand smoke litigation,1 4
defective products that the Secondary has negligently manipulated or altered, 4 31
property owners with inadequate security measures in crime-ridden neighborhoods,
negligent municipalities or companies whose poor maintenance of defective roadways
or property contributed to injuries caused by negligent drivers,'44 vicarious employer
liability or respondeatsuperiorclaims,145 failure of an employer to provide work areas

Cir. 1997) (finding bullet manufacturer did not have duty to control distribution of ammunition
to protect against gunman's act in opening fire).
140. Rabin, supra note 131, at 435-36.
141. See Broin v. Philip Dobbs Cos., 641 So. 2d 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
(certifying a class in an action by flight attendants for their alleged second-hand smoke injuries).
142. Although most product liability cases proceed in strict liability a few Enablers have
been held liable for negligence in product manufacture. See Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 700 N.E.2d
303,308 (N.Y. 1998) (requiring duty to warn of foreseeable risks of harm even when there is no
design defect liability).
143. Sharon P. v. Arman, Ltd., 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 640 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (liable owner
of parking complex in which plaintiff had been sexually assaulted, despite no prior incidents);
Zuniga v. Hous. Auth., 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 353 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (public housing authority
liable for failing to make arrests or erect safety barriers in building, where tenants died as a
result of arson); Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(landlord duty to protect against third-party violence); Carlisle v. Ulysses Line Ltd., S.A., 475
So. 2d 248 (Fla. Ct. App. 1985) (cruise line failed to warn or protect against masked gunman in
port); Tenney v. Atl. Assocs., 594 N.W.2d 11 (Iowa 1999) (landlord liability for negligently
supervising lock changes and key issuance where tenant was raped in apartment); Cruz v.
Middlekauff Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 909 P.2d 1252 (Utah 1996) (keys left in car where theft was
likely means defendant may be proximate cause of harms done by thief while trying to escape
police). But see Ann M. v. Pac. Plaza Shopping Center, 863 P.2d 207 (Cal. 1993) (no duty of
shopping mall retail store owner to provide security absent previous incidents); Leslie G. v.
Perry & Assoc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (rejecting landlord liability where
only evidence of negligence was expert's testimony that rapist was attracted to and entered the
garage because of broken security gate).
144. Bigbee v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 665 P.2d 947 (Cal. 1983) (jury question whether
telephone company is liable when man in phone booth with a faulty door could not escape car
veering onto sidewalk); McKenna v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 558 P.2d 1018 (Haw.
1977) (city liable for constructing defective road shoulder where negligent driver caused
accident); Cruz v. City of New York, 218 A.D.2d 546 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (construction crew
leaving hole in road where negligent driver drove into it, became immobilized, and a second car
struck the first, injuring the second driver); Harvey v. Hansen, 445 A.2d 1228 (Pa. Super. 1982)
(sign obstruction by bushes facilitating vehicles' collision).
145. Warner Trucking, Inc. v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co., 686 N.E.2d 102 (Ind. 1997)
(employer may still be liable for intoxicated driver's actions, even if driving in violation of
company rule); Foster v. The Loft, Inc., 526 N.E.2d 1309 (Mass. Ct. App. 1988) (failure to
properly screen formerly convicted bartender who punched plaintiff); McLean v. Kirby Co., 490
N.W.2d 229 (N.D. 1992) (employer hiring door-to-door salesman without conducting simple
and revealing background check liable for salesman's rape of potential buyer); Christensen v.
Swensen, 874 P.2d 125 (Utah 1994) (setting standards for vicarious employer liability for
employee's negligence toward third party during course of employment).
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safe from third-party dangers, 146 media or publisher "inducement" of negligent or
reckless behavior, 147 liability for Enablers where Mother Nature is the intervening
cause of harm, 14 lawsuits against both tobacco and the fast food industry in which the
plaintiffs cast themselves as "remote victims" as a result of the products' purported
addictiveness, 149 and perhaps even crime-enabling speech.15s

146. Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U.S. 459, 461-62 (1947) (holding railroad company
liable for assault upon woman employee).
Petitioner alleged in effect that respondent was aware of conditions which
created a likelihood that a young woman performing the duties required of
petitioner would suffer just such an injury as was in fact inflicted upon her. That
the foreseeable danger was from intentional or criminal misconduct is irrelevant;
respondent nonetheless had a duty to make reasonable provision against it. Breach
of that duty would be negligence, and we cannot say as a matter of law that
petitioner's injury did not result at least in part from such negligence.
Id. See also Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 414 N.E.2d 666 (N.Y. 1980) (employer who
failed to erect adequate traffic barricade liable to plaintiff construction worker struck and injured
by negligent driver).
147. Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc., 539 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1975) (disc jockey announcing that
first listeners to drive to his location would win prize liable for vehicular death caused by
listeners' reckless driving). But cf Rice v. Paladin Enter.'s, Inc., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997)
(where writer conceded intent in publishing tutorial on murder was to assist crime perpetrators,
liability attaches); Olivia N. v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1981) (negligence alone
not enough to create liability for television broadcaster's inducing viewer to commit "copycat"
crime).
148. Gallick v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 372 U.S. 108 (1963) (finding jury question of
employer's negligence where employee working near a standing pool of water was bitten by an
insect and suffered life-threatening infection); Bradford v. Universal Constr. Co., 644 So. 2d
864 (Ala. 1994) (unsecured plywood sheets that wind blew into plaintiff); Lanz v. Pearson, 475
N.W.2d 601, 603 (Iowa 1991) (Act of God jury instruction denied because icy and obscured
highway conditions could have been "reasonably anticipated."). Butsee Memphis & C.R. Co. v.
Reeves, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 176 (1869) (no liability for delayed tobacco shipments destruction
due to "unexpected" and "sudden and extraordinary" flood); Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores, Inc.
v. Salt Lake City Corp., 887 P.2d 848 (Utah 1994) ("no duty" to protect against "unforeseeable"
flooding). At least one court has noted where a defendant was negligent and the inclement
conditions were extraordinary and "unforeseeable," the liability "concurs" and the defendant
remains liable for the whole of the harm done. Lang v. Wonnenberg, 455 N.W.2d 832 (N.D.
1990). This ruling is equivalent to a joint-and-several liability rule that imposes all financial
burden on the Primary where the Secondary is not reachable.
149. For example, class action attorneys have recently targeted the fast food industry in
enabling-style lawsuits. See Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(dismissing lawsuit for lack of specificity against McDonald's restaurants for allegedly
contributing to minors' obesity). The theory for recovery is that these fast food chains have
concealed their aim and internal research efforts to improve the taste of their calorie-laden food
products to make them more "addicting," and that these foods, consumed in excess, contribute
to the myriad health conditions associated with obesity. See ERIC SCHLOSSER, FAST FOOD

(2d ed. 2002) (describing emergence of
"flavor industry" to increase sales of American fast food products). Similar lawsuits against
tobacco companies are now familiar. Rabin disputes that these are true enabling torts, insomuch
as the injured third parties are also responsible. Nonetheless, by asserting the "addictiveness" of
NATION: THE DARK SIDE OF THE ALL-AMERICAN MEAL
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While these examples confirm enabling torts newfound popularity, many counterexamples persist.' 5' Such inconsistency must be explained. Rabin, like Richard Posner
before him, 5 2 asserts that the "inconsistency" in applying enabling tort is nothing more
than proper determination of which party is best suited to bear liability.' 53 This view
equates liability with capabilityor suitabilityto providesocial insurance.5 4 However
appealing Rabin's theory may be prescriptively,' 55 it is not the motivation behind the
new popularity of enabling tort. Courts assume much more righteous airs, invoking
on
terms such as "fairness" or "morality" to justify the reachback liability they place
56
Primaries. These are judicial fighting words, not bland cost-benefit musings.'
these products, the plaintiffs are clearly trying to shift liability from themselves to the Enablers
to conform their lawsuits to the now-recognized form of enabling tort. See generally Little v.
York County Earned Income Tax Bureau, 481 A.2d 1194, 1201 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (woman
incarcerated for failure to pay income taxes can recover emotional harms damages from
negligent tax advisor).
150. Eugene Volokh, Crime-FacilitatingSpeech, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1095 (2005).
151. Brewer v. Teano, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (no recovery against
deceased's estate for emotional harms stemming from arrest and prosecution where plaintiffs
car had been struck by deceased's, but plaintiff fled the scene in apparent fear of the deceased
and was arrested on suspicion of felony hit and run); Poskus v. Lombardo's of Randolph, Inc.,
670 N.E.2d 383 (Mass. 1996) (no Enabler liability for negligent valet service when police
officer suffered injury arresting car thief who had already abandoned vehicle); Sheehan v. City
ofNew York, 354 N.E.2d 832 (N.Y. 1976) (no Enabler liability where bus in violation of traffic
regulations did not pull over to curb when stopping and was struck from behind by negligently
driven garbage truck, injuring bus passenger); Johnson v. Angretti, 73 A.2d 666 (Pa. 1950) (no
liability for bus company where bus negligently stopped in the road and another driver
negligently tried to overtake the bus but struck and killed oncoming car's driver); Newton v.
S.C. Public Rys. Comm'n, 462 S.E.2d 266 (S.C. 1995) (defendant employed to maintain
malfunctioning railroad crossing signal not liable when plaintiff stopped as a result of signal and
was struck from behind by negligent driver who failed to halt); Phan Son Van v. Pefia, 990
S.W.2d 751 (Tex. 1999) (storeowner who negligently and illegally sold alcohol to minors not
liable for subsequent murder commission). Other counter-examples are offered throughout notes
143-48, supra.
152. Richard A. Posner, A Theory ofNegligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972) (arguing
that responsibility, especially in civil law, should be placed on the person who is in the best
place to most cheaply avoid the loss).
153. For example, Rabin concludes for crime-ridden property cases: "[n]ot only is the
renter in a better position than the tenant to adopt precautionary measures, but the renter is
better situated than the police to diminish the risk of criminal assault on the premises-the
police, after all, cannot be expected to patrol the interiors of large residential apartment
buildings and to exercise vigilance in private spaces." Rabin, EnablingTorts, supranote 131, at
444. Is this really why Enabler liability is increasing?
154. Rabin concedes that an implicit but important motivation behind some enabling
torts may simply be an attempt to reach solvent pocketbooks. Id. at 444 (suggesting a major
motivation of enabling tort "is the inability to effectively reach the putative [Secondary]
wrongdoer himself, either through criminal or tort sanctions. This is the... link to creating
responsibility for enabling behavior.").
155. Kindynamic Theory rejects Rabin's theory as inconsistent with the major goals of
tort law. See supra text at Part I.
156. In re Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708, 719 (2d Cir. 1964) ("[T]he discredited
notion that only the last wrongful act can be a [liable] cause [is] a notion as faulty in logic as it
is wanting in fairness."); Michael S. Moore, The Metaphysics of CausalIntervention, 88 CAL. L.
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Kindynamic theorists assert that the reason for confusion and incorrect theories
about when enabling tort is the suitable form of liability stems from a lack of rigorous
quantificationof the Primary's and Secondary's respective risk contributions. Without
knowing how much risk of a future injury an agent contributes, it is an utterly futile
proposition to apportion to him any particular amount of blame or to have confidence
that that liability is a "deterrent" commensurate with that actor's risk contribution. Yet
courts are universally lacking a rigorous risk quantification metric, namely EBL and
decision analysis. 157 Moreover, varied and inconsistent terminology obscures the causal
principles behind "enablement."158 Absent risk quantification and a solid understanding
of the causal principles that underlie tort law, we should hardly be surprised that recent
commitment to enabling torts appears to some as proof that tort is "out of control" or
"arbitrarily" decided. Yet, as we report next, Kindynamic theorists offer a new
consistent method for establishing when to (and when not to) extend liability to
Enablers.

REv. 827, 828 (2000) ("It is morality, not legal policy, that tells us that actions that cause harm
are more blameworthy than those that merely attempt or risk such harm."). Cf U.S. v. Gottshall,
512 U.S. 532, 543 (1994) ("FELA does not make the employer the insurer of the safety of his
employees while they are on duty. The basis of his liability is his negligence, not the fact that
injuries occur." (quoting Ellis v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 329 U.S. 649, 653 (1947))).
157. It is evident that courts desire some workable risk calculus in enabling tort.
Consider, for instance, one federal court's implicit adoption of a primitive risk assessment for
handgun liability:
"Duty" at its essence is a question of policy. While there is ageneral reluctance to
impose liability where harm results in part from the conduct of third-party tortious
or criminal conduct,.. .a duty of care could be imposed on gun manufacturers
where there was a tangible showing that defendants were a direct link in the causal
chain that resulted in the plaintiffs' injuries and defendants were realistically in a
position to prevent the wrongs. A showing of a direct link between the negligence
and damage to the public at large ensures that there is no threat of a specter of
limitless liability. Importantin the determinationis thata plaintiffnot rely merely
on the foreseeabilityof harm to attempt to hold all members ofan industry liable,
but rather present evidence tending to show to what degree the risk of injury was
enhanced by the presence ofnegligently or intentionally harmfully marketed and
distributedguns.
NAACP v. AcuSport, Inc., 271 F. Supp.2d 435,490-91 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (emphasis
added) (citations omitted).
158. Commentators, including courts, have sometimes described Rabin's "enablement"
as "indirect causation." Marbled Murrclet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060, 1065 (9th Cir. 1996)
(referring to habitat alteration as "indirect cause of harm" for interpretation of Endangered
Species Act); Erich J. Greene & John M. Darley, Effects of Necessary, Sufficient, and Indirect
Causation on Judgments of Criminal Liability, 22 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 429, 439-41 (1998).
Others have indicated that language patterns may be to blame for proper understanding of
enabling causality. For example, one pair of authors has shown psychological differences
prompt some to write statements such as "the plant bloomed" and others to write "the gardener
caused the plant to bloom." The authors contend that the linguistic similarity ofthese statements
encourages judges to bypass causality issues without critically considering causal differences in
these statements. Lawrence M. Solan & John M. Darley, Causation, Contribution,and Legal
Liability: An Empirical Study, 64 LAW & CONTMEt'. PROBs. 265, 279-80 (2001).
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B. Kindynamic Modes of Joint Tortfeasor Liability: Traditional,Enabling,and
LeapfroggingLiability
The usual test for assessing division of liability among multiple parties asks whether
159
a Secondary is a superseding cause. In the traditional model (see supra Figure
Three), a superseding cause exists and only the Secondary is liable. In enabling tort, no
superseding cause exists and both Enabler and Secondary are liable (see supra Figure
Five).
16 0
foreseeability."
The existence of a superseding cause usually turns on "reasonable
We already have seen the problems with "foreseeability;" to be consistent in allocating
liability, we need a better delimiting definition of superseding cause.
Two fact patterns can clarify what "superseding cause" is getting at. Construction
employee A is working on a busy public highway near traffic. Employer B, without
to protect A and others. An
statutory obligation to do so, 166 erects a barricade
automobile veers out of control and crashes through the barricade. Stronger barricades

159. Dobbs attempts to explain superceding cause's motivation:
A ruling that an intervening actor is a superseding cause embodies the dual
conclusion that the intervening actor should be responsible and that the original
actor, in spite of his causal negligence, should not.... [I]n contemporary law, when
courts then ask what counts as a superseding cause... [t]he rule is that if the
intervening cause itself is part of the risk negligently created by the defendant, or if
it is reasonably foreseeable at the time of the defendant's negligent conduct, then it
is not a superseding cause at all. In that case, the defendant is not relieved of
liability merely because some other person or force triggered the injury.
DOBBS, supra note 6, § 186, citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 442(A)-(B). However,

like others before him, Dobbs is linguistically hampered by a lack of firm definitions for
negligence and proximate risk. See ROBERT E. KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORTS
(1963); Glanville Williams, The Risk Principle,77 L. Q. REv. 179 (1961); Warren A. Seavey,
Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 52 HARV. L. REV. 371 (1939).
160. Duphily v. Delaware Electric Coop. Inc., 662 A.2d 821, 829 (Del. 1995)
If the intervening negligence of a third party was reasonably foreseeable, the
original tortfeasor is liable for his negligence because the causal connection
between the original tortious act and the resulting injury remains unbroken. If,
however, the intervening negligence was not reasonably foreseeable, the
intervening act supersedes and becomes the sole proximate cause of the plaintiffs
injuries, thus relieving the original tortfeasor of liability.
Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
161. The issue of inferring negligence or proximate risk from statutory non-compliance
complicates risk analysis, and thus, liability analysis. Statutes can be generated by politics or
other factors, rather than pure risk analysis. If a statute is divorced from optimal Kindynamic
policy, non-compliance does not mean a person is negligent, yet the legal presumption usually
given to non-compliance is that the person is negligent. Cass Sunstein has championed the
evident way to solve this deadlock: create administrative and legislative policies that are rooted
in Kindynamic analysis, not politics. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND
THE ENVIRONMENT (2002). If Sunstein's vision is achieved, illegality would become a better
proxy of negligence or proximate risk.
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could have slowed, perhaps stopped, the careening car. A is injured by the car. B is
probably liable to A.' 62
Now imagine a permutation: an airplane crashes on the highway, slides down the
road and breaks through the barricade. It causes exactly the same injuries to A as the
car collision would have. There are barricades that can shield against sliding airplanes,
but they are quite expensive. B is probably not liable to A.'63
Most people should have an intuitive understanding of the difference in these
liability results: an airplane strike seems "extraordinary," while a car collision seems
"normal." Our intuition, while correct, conceals that there are two pertinent differences.
First, the likelihood of being struck by an airplane while working on an urban street is
orders of magnitude lower than the likelihood of being struck by a car. 164 Thus,
airplane strikes are less likely to amount to a "significant" risk than are vehicular
collisions. The second difference is a cost-benefit consideration: the airplane barricade
is much more expensive than is a vehicular barricade. Even if the risks of an airplane
strike and a vehicular strike were equally likely, the marginal risk reduction benefit
from investment in a vehicular barricade would be greater than from investment in
airplane barricades. Kindynamic Theory urges investment of risk-reducing dollars in
the most efficient manner possible.
These examples make evident that "reasonable foreseeability," the fulcrum on
which superseding cause currently rests, should be replaced by our definition of
proximate risk (see boxed text at note 109 supra). Kindynamic Theory accordingly
rewords the superseding cause test:
If a tortfeasor creates a proximate risk and if relevant duty exists, there is no
superseding cause for that tortfeasor.
A Secondary's acts may (1) cause new, additionalrisks; or (2) amplify existing
risks. If a Secondary creates a new risk, a Primary obviously shares no liability. But if a
Secondary amplifies a risk to which the Primary also contributed, multiparty liability
allocation is not as simple. One must then ask: what would the risk have been in the
absence of the Secondary's behavior? Would the Primary's risk have been
"significant" on its own? To see this concept better, consider the following diagram
(assume the "significant" risk threshold is 0.3):

162. See Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 414 N.E.2d 666 (N.Y. 1980) (finding
liability for this fact pattern). In this example, we are assuming that the cause of action is
negligence, not workman's compensation.
163. See Doss v. Town of Big Stone Gap, 134 S.E. 563 (Va. 1926) (finding no liability
for alleged negligence of city in forcing vehicular detour around impassable road where
decedent was struck and killed by an airplane while on detour).
164. Kimberly M. Thompson et al., The Risk of Groundling Fatalitiesfrom
UnintentionalAirplane Crashes,21 RiSK ANALYsis 1025 (2001) (estimating the total lifetime
risk of a groundling being killed by an airplane to be approximately nine in ten million persons,
with the risk "rapidly declining" outside the first two miles around an airport).
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Figure 6
Risk "Significance": A Requirement for Individual Liability
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To set liability for jointly caused risks, it is essential to quantitatively determine
whether thatfraction of the total risk attributable to a Primary is a proximate risk on its
own. Even if the Primary's risk contribution is "significant," his actions may be
economically justified and therefore still not create a proximate risk. 165 But if not, the
judge will conclude
that a reasonable jury could find the Primary to have created a
166
proximate risk.

To assess a Secondary's liability for amplifying an existing risk, the same method
applies: first one subtracts the Primary's risk contribution from the total risk. If the
remaining risk fraction attributable to the Secondary is "significant"-and observe that
nothing invariably requires the "significant" risk cut-off be the same for a Secondary
an independentproximate risk if his act
and a Primary-the Secondary has contributed
167
is unexcused by decision analysis or duty.

165. See supra Part IV.B.
166. Even this doesn't mean Primary liability follows automatically. Procedurally, a
judge determines duty, not proximate risk. A policy consideration, unrelated to negligence or
proximate risk, could still militate against finding a duty. But if there is no such policy concern,
the case goes to a jury, which will (re)deliberate the issues of negligence and proximate risk to
set liability. Note that even after being released to a jury, cases can be dismissed on other
grounds such as failure to demonstrate actual causality or injury, or for procedural or
jurisdictional reasons.
167. Note that for a Secondary to be liable every element of proximate risk must be met,
independent of other risk contributions.For instance, there is a temptation to erroneously place

liability on the Secondary if his amplification of extant risk causes the total risk-not his
individual contributionto that total-to be significant. See Lipke v. Celotex Corp., which held:
[O]ne guilty of negligence cannot avoid responsibility merely because another
person is guilty of negligence contributing to the same injury. Under Romine v.
City of Watseka (1950), 341 Ill. App. 370, 377, 91 N.E.2d 76, where such guilt
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Up to now, we have discussed two ways liability is allocated among multiple
tortfeasors: traditional and enabling tort. Kindynamic Theory recognizes a third form
of liability allocation, "leapfrogging tort." Leapfrogging tort, like enabling tort or
traditional tort, involves a Secondary who (1) creates a new (additional) proximate
risk,168 or (2) amplifies an existing risk of the Primary's. For example: DriverA creates
a risk of injurious collision with each of two pedestrians, B and C. To escape injury, B
dives out of the car's path. A swerves and grazes C. Simultaneously, B's dive knocks C
if A alone had
down, breaking C's arm. This broken arm would not have occurred
16
1
grazed C. C can recover against A but not B for his broken arm.
The conceptual premise of leapfrogging tort is subtle to catch particularly because it
is unintuitive that the last contributing agent in a causal chain known to lead to harm
assumes no liability. Yet this is exactly what sometimes happens. 7 The implication of
leapfrogging tort is that all liability bypasses the Secondary actor and accrues entirely
to Enablers upstream (in the two-person model, to the Primary). If those Enablers also
did not individually create proximate risks, there simply is no liability, even if there has
been cognizable injury.

exists, 'it is no defense thatsome otherperson, or thingcontributedto bring about
the resultfor which damages are claimed. Either or both parties are liable for all
damages sustained'. Thus, the fact that plaintiff used a variety of asbestos
products does not relieve defendantof liabilityfor his injuries.Evidence ofsuch
exposure is not relevant.
505 N.E.2d 1213, 1221 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (emphasis added). See also Kochan v. OwensApp. Ct. 1993) (same).
Coming Fiberglass Corp., 610 N.E.2d 683 (I11.
Further, a Secondary may amplify extant risk-perhaps even "significantly"-but has still
not created a proximate risk if decision analysis exonerates his act. In such an instance, liability
for the Secondary's "significant" but economically justifiable risk increase could be assigned
jointly and severally to those tortfeasors who did create a proximate risk of that injury. But cf
Kennedy v. Southern Calif. Edison, 268 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding, in a multifactorial
causation case, that microscopic particles fo radioactive material that the plaintiff's husbad
carried home on his work clothes was not a substantial factor in causing her leukemia, where the
court defined "substantial" as something more than "negligible" or "infinitesimal" or
"theoretical").
168. This includes the class of"rescue" cases in which a person who aids the victim of a
negligent tortfeasor is himself injured in the rescue attempt. In the rescue cases, the rescuer has
created a novel risk of harm-injury to himself-rather than having amplified the extent or
likelihood of injuries to the original victim. See Thomas v. Garner, 672 N.E.2d 52 (I11. App. Ct.
1996); Solomon v. Shuell, 457 N.W.2d 669 (Mich. 1990); Wagner v. Int'l. R.R. Co., 133 N.E.
437 (N.Y. 1921).
169. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 445cmt. C, illus. 3 (1965) (describing
leapfrogging tort by example: "A negligently drives his car so as to endanger B in the street. To
escape being hit B leaps out of the way. In doing so he knocks down C,who was not in the path
of the car. A's liability to C will depend upon whether he should have realized when driving that
such a person in the vicinity of B might be injured by his negligent driving.").
170. Consider, for instance, emotional harms or fear claims. In such cases, risk
communicators-who often are the ultimate "cause" of fear-almost universally escape liability,
while physical injurers who have allegedly placed a plaintiff at physical risk must pay the
entirety of the fear or emotional harm claim, sometimes even if that fear is irrational. See
generally Christopher P. Guzelian, Liability & Fear,65 OHIO ST. L.J. 713 (2004).
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Kindynamic Theory corrects perennial oversights about why enabling tort is coming
into vogue. Enabling tort always should have been recognized. The long-running
failure to do so consistently is attributable to misconceptions about risk. How could
courts expect to correctly identify multiple proximate risks resulting in a single harm,
as in enabling tort, when judges have enough trouble identifying single proximate
risks? Undoubtedly similar misapprehensions explain why leapfrogging tort has not
even been named before. But under Kindynamic Theory, torts 17
involving two causal
actors can result in three distinct modes of liability assignment: 1

171. We have been working with the simplest form of enabling tort: cases with two
alleged tortfeasors. But the principles are generalizable. If there are N accused tortfeasors,
liability should accrue to however many of those actors have created independent proximate
risks. To do this in practice, one should calculate the total risk and then determine each of the N
actors' potential proximate risk creations by beginning farthest upstream in the causal chain.
Each layer of risk augmentation or additional risk creation, regardless ofwhether it amounts to a
proximate risk, should be subtracted from the total risk magnitude or number of risks, until the
last tortfeasor, by definition, the only non-Enabler, is reached. Presumably, if there are
numerous risk communicators who each created a proximate risk they are jointly and severally
liable, along with any proximately negligent physical injurers for a resulting injury. To the
extent that a state does not recognize joint-and-several liability, other liability apportioning
mechanisms may have to be introduced, such as market share liability or m. See Hamilton v.
Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (imposing collective liability for sellers of.25
caliber handguns who negligently marketed handguns, such that they were too likely to be used
illegally and criminally by teenagers); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989)
(market share approach adopted in DES cases); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37 (Wis.
1984) (liability in proportion to risk imposed, with market share relevant to determining that risk
proportion). But see Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324 (11. 1990) (rejecting market share
approach to collective liability for DES production). Novel liability apportionment schemes
may also be more efficient in some circumstances. See Ronen Avraham, Modularliability rules,
24 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 269 (2004).
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Figure 7
Kindynamic Theory's Modes of Liability
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CONCLUSION

Legal scholars complain that traditional tort theory is inadequate to address the
expanding scope of risks in the post-industrial world. 172 The alleged risks that are
increasingly finding their way into litigation are more complex and less intuitive to
establish. Risks are also dynamic constructs subject to change as risk assessment
1 73
generates greater knowledge about their causal and numerical natures. Tort must
accurately reflect the dynamic nature of risk analysis.
Most jurists and scholars concur that the primary aim of tort law is (efficient) risk
deterrence. Thus, this Article set out asking and preliminarily answering two brief
questions. First, what is a risk? Second, how does one objectively determine which
risks to deter through tort?
The typical Industrial era attorney would have answered these questions by
immediately launching into a lengthy, and at times muddied, discussion of duty and
breach (negligence), and proximate cause. He would have given a short nod to general
or specific causation 74 -issues that were rarely contentious.

172. See supranote 9.
173. In assessing by EBL whether a nomological possibility is a risk, stare decisis
makes less sense than anywhere else in the field of law. Current scientific knowledge, not legal
precedent, determines what is, and is not, a risk.
174. The leading legal treatise on causation, H.L.A. HART & ToNY HONORE, CAUSATION
INTHE LAW (2d ed. 1985), is out-of-print. Causation, the fulcrum of Kindynamic tort law, is
undoubtedly being under-addressed.
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But as risk knowledge has improved and as risks have changed, the population of
risks alleged in modem courtrooms is not the same as in 1930. A new theory of tortKindynamic Theory-accommodates these changes. Kindynamic Theory hones the
understanding of long sensed, but poorly articulated tort intuitions in three ways, and
offers one significant prescriptive modification to tort.
First, contrary to its many everyday definitions, the word "risk" has a single exact
meaning in Kindynamic Theory. To a Kindynamic theorist, a risk must be objectively
known to be possible ("epistemically possible"). Put differently, Kindynamics
prescribes that a specific alleged stimulus must be objectively known to cause a
particular harm before liability can even begin to be considered. 175 This can only be
achieved by use of Evidence-Based Logic (EBL), the transparent and systematic
protocol for identifying scientific knowledge.
Second, and in the only notable break with traditional tort intuition, many
Kindynamic proponents advocate modifying tort by permitting compensation only for
"significant" risks. This particular brand of risk (which must also usually result in
injury to be redressable by tort) is (1) widespreadand (2) likely to be injurious.Similar
to common regulatory practice, this prescriptive constraint
seeks to sensibly prioritize
76
risk deterrence, given limited judicial resources. 1
Third, Kindynamic Theory invokes decision analysis-the method for formal,
quantitative risk analysis universally familiar to risk analysts-to elucidate risk
tradeoffs and make decisions about the costs and benefits of a risk. With its empirical
grounding, decision analysis improves upon cost-benefit
models that are typically too
77
theoretical or assumption-laden for practical use. 1
Finally, courts have long desired and intuitively but unsuccessfully sought an
objective method for apportioning liability for a single injury among multiple alleged
tortfeasors. Kindynamic Theory is the tort theory that formally presents such a
17
method. 1
Kindynamics is indeed in one aspect (risk prioritization) apurely prescriptive theory
that does not pretend to capture past legal trends. 7 9 Other than risk prioritization,
however, Kindynamics is not a prescriptive theory, but rather a rigorous restatement
and clarification of longstanding tort intuitions. Kindynamics only seems prescriptive
and novel because it uses new vocabulary and is a uniquely demanding, quantitative,
and precise way of thinking about traditional tort concepts.

175. See supra Part I-III.
176. See supra Part IV.A.
177. See supra Part IV.B.
178. See supra Part VI.
179. The argument of those Kindynamicists who advocate risk prioritization (and not all
Kindynamic thinkers do) is that even assuming the goal of tort were solely corrective justicethe right to have one's day in court-risk prioritization is logically necessary as long as a
jurisdiction's case load overtaxes thorough judicial review of each case. If courts can only
sufficiently address a certain number/category of cases, then each jurisdiction effectively has a
"race" system of case prioritization. Whoever files suit first or bangs one's fist the loudest gets
more adequate redress, while others may receive shoddy judicial attention or simply settle the
case under suboptimal terms to avoid such treatment. Kindynamics contends that if individual
justice must be constrained (and if the Soviet command-control nature of tort law does
constrain), then why not do so sensibly according to a primary tenet of tort: proximate risk?
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It is true that Kindynamics rejects many decisions as improper. While some will
accuse it of being a purely prescriptive theory dressed in explanatory clothing, it must
be understood that Kindynamics is often times not criticizing the aims of
decisionmakers in cases it declares "wrongly" decided. Rather, because of its rigorous
nature, Kindynamic Theory is uniquely capable of discovering that judges, lacking
access to the powerfully objective and precise tools of EBL (evidence-based logic),
decision analysis, and Kindynamic multiparty liability allocation, have often reached
conclusions they simply did not intend to make. Indeed, Kindynamic advocates
contend that if courts had been able to apply Kindynamic methods, many outcomes
would have been different, even when holdingjudges' andjuries' tortphilosophies
constant.
180
Kindynamic Theory holds great promise as a modem theory of tort. In a complex
world, Kindynamic Theory is better suited than its predecessors to achieving the age
old jurist's wish to efficiently marshall judicial resources towards deterring society's
most pressing risks and fairly recompense those harmed by those risks.

180. Kindynamic Theory is currently investigating how to systematically frame the
causal question underlying any risk. Scientific investigation is capable of establishing nearly any
risk as epistemic if a causal proposition is stated too broadly. Conversely, if a risk proposition is
put too narrowly, scientific knowledge will nearly always be incapable of speaking to such an
overly restrictive proposition. What is therefore required is an objective process for framing the
appropriate scope of the cause A and effect B at issue in a particular claim, then assessing by
evidence-based methods whether a risk indeed exists as a general causal proposition. It will then
be up to the trier of fact to assess through the introduction of case-specific evidence whether the
plaintiff's individual circumstances meet that general pattern of that risk. See generally
Guzelian, supra note 51.

